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THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA
MACKENZIE KING AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY:
THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND THE UNITED NATIONS

by



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A THESIS

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ABSTRACT

This study is a revisionist account of Mackenzie King's views on a major aspect of Canadian foreign policy, collective security and international organizations, and assesses the measure of continuity in his thought and policy during his years as Secretary of State for External Affairs. His tenure in office, the longest in Canadian political history, spanned the existence and demise of the League of Nations and the conception and birth of the United Nations. In a unique way he was able to make Canadian foreign policy reflect his ideas and attitudes towards two international organizations as no other Canadian Prime Minister or Foreign Minister has ever done.

There are three main themes: Mackenzie King's concern to protect and advance Canada's status as an independent state at the international level, his desire to minimize as much as possible Canada's obligations under a collective security system, and his adaptation to the changes in international affairs caused by the Second World War.

The Mackenzie King Papers, the Archives of the Department of External Affairs, and the Skelton Papers are used extensively. Other documentary sources such as the debates of the House of Commons, records of the League of Nations, and documents published by the Department of External Affairs are also used. A lengthy list of secondary sources is included in the bibliography.

PREFACE

Current Canadian historiography has, in general, treated Mackenzie King's foreign policy in an incidental fashion with the years preceding the Second World War being the major subject of inquiry. J. Munro, in "The Riddell Affair Reconsidered," is critical of the King government while R. Bothwell and J. English, in "'Dirty Work At The Crossroads': New Perspectives on the Riddell Incident," attempt to distribute responsibility for the affair and its consequences to as many individuals as possible. J. L. Granatstein and R. Bothwell take up the defence of King's foreign policy in "'A Self-Evident National Duty': Canadian Foreign Policy, 1935-1939" in an attempt to refute the argument that Mackenzie King was an isolationist and an opponent of collective security. While Granatstein does not go so far in his Canada's War The Politics of the Mackenzie King Government 1939-1945 as to align himself with those historians who argue that King became a convert to collective security during World War II, he does note that a number of changes in the direction of Canadian foreign and defence policies occurred during the war which culminated in a diplomatic revolution. But, again, Granatstein deals only with a portion of King's foreign policy.

H. B. Neatby's latest volume on Mackenzie King, The Prism of Unity, ends with the outbreak of war in 1939. He argues that King's policy was one of "national unity," and that his concept of Canada and political leadership influenced his approach to foreign policy and his role as Foreign Minister. D. G. Creighton deals with the period from 1939 to 1957 in his new volume, The Forked Road. The

general subject of Canadian policy and the League of Nations is analysed by R. Veatch in his Canada and the League of Nations. However, the main themes of Veatch's study overlook the role of the decision-maker in the formulation of Canadian policy. Only a three-volume study of J. Eayrs, In Defence of Canada, attempts to look at the course of Mackenzie King's foreign policy in its entirety.

An episodic treatment of Canadian foreign policy, though, is a rather weak method to show the influence of attitudes and perceptions over a period of time on a decision-maker's concept of international relations and of international security organizations. Moreover, the method does not readily lend itself to an analysis of the influence of both domestic and external circumstances on the decision-maker, or of the intellectual development of the decision-maker in response to the interaction of a number of diverse factors. This study analyses Mackenzie King's views on the issue of collective security and international organizations and assesses the degree of continuity in his thought and policy throughout his years in office. The study ends in 1945 with the United Nations Conference on International Organization at San Francisco. A detailed analysis of King's views in the period 1945-1948 is not a part of this study for two reasons. First, after 1945 and particularly after Louis St. Laurent's appointment as Secretary of State for External Affairs in 1946, Mackenzie King's role in the formulation of Canadian foreign policy steadily declined. Second, at the time the research for this study was being done documentary sources for the post-war period at both the Public Archives of Canada and the Department of External Affairs were not available.

This study is based in large measure on archival sources recently opened. With the lapse of the thirty-year rule, the Mackenzie King

collection at the Public Archives of Canada has been opened to the public up to the end of 1945. Previously, only material to the end of 1931 was available for general use. The Archives of the Department of External Affairs have also opened to the end of 1945, giving researchers access to primary material on the years of the Second World War. External Affairs material prior to 1941 is, for the most part, found in the Skelton Papers at the Public Archives. The debates of the House of Commons, the published texts of debates and minutes of committee meetings of the League of Nations, and the document series on Canada's external relations published by the Department of External Affairs have also been used extensively.

Many times a year the staffs of the Public Archives and the National Library guide puzzled researchers through the wondrous world of manuscripts, collections, and government and institutional publications. This writer gratefully acknowledges their invaluable assistance. M. G. Blanchet, Director of the Historical Division of the Department of External Affairs gave my requests personal attention which I did not expect but came to rely upon heavily. The History Department of the University of Alberta provided financial assistance. The manuscript was read by Professors David Hall and John Eagle, both of the History Department of the University of Alberta. Their observations and comments were valuable. Finally, I should like to acknowledge the sources of inspiration for this study, Professor David Murray of the Department of History, and Professor Robert Simmons of the Department of Political Studies, both at the University of Guelph.

J.C.A.

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CHAPTER I

PROLOGUE

The League of Nations was not a new idea in 1919; rather, it was the culmination of centuries of effort and thought in the search for perpetual peace. Since the seventeenth century the doctrines of binding arbitration and mediation between states, of inquiry and delay in international disputes, of safeguards and sanctions had been familiar subjects in international law. The Congress of Westphalia in 1645, the Congress of Vienna in 1814, and the Concert of Europe of the nineteenth century were leagues of a kind in that they were concerned with the recognition of the sovereignty of the nation-state and the maintenance of peace. International co-operation was fostered in the nineteenth century by the advent of various functional organizations like the Red Cross, the Universal Postal Union, the Danube Commission, and the World Meteorological Organization. The "rules of war" were the product of the Geneva Convention of 1864 and the conferences at The Hague in 1899 and 1907. The trend of public opinion supported peace movements; pacifism was a hallmark of international socialism.¹

The immediate origins of the League of Nations can be traced in the development of both private and public schemes during the Great War and in the negotiations that took place at the Paris Peace Conference. A "League to Enforce Peace" appeared in the United States and the "League of Nations Society" was founded in Britain, both in 1915.² Lord Robert Cecil, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in both the Asquith and Lloyd George wartime

administrations, devoted himself to the advocacy of post-war organizational effort in the British Cabinet with the result that Lord Balfour, the Foreign Secretary, established a committee to examine the proposals for a League of Nations and to draft a practicable scheme.³ In the United States, President Wilson gave public support to the concept of a League of Nations as early as 1916. On January 8, 1918, as the last of his Fourteen Points, Wilson declared that "a general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike."⁴ Wilson and his close adviser, Colonel House, undertook the preparation of the American blueprints for the proposed organization. A pamphlet written by General Jan Smuts, the Defence Minister of South Africa and one of its delegates to Paris in 1919, in late 1918 was an attempt to popularize the concept of a League of Nations⁵ and, according to Inis Claude Jr., was "the most significant example of governmental thinking about international organization submitted to the peace conference."⁶

The actual formulation of the Covenant of the League of Nations was the work of a special committee established by the Paris Peace Conference, which began its sessions in January 1919. The Allies demonstrated their indifference to the League Commission by nominating members of their delegations other than their chief delegates to it. Wilson sat on the Commission as the representative of the United States, but Lord Robert Cecil and Jan Smuts were the British delegates, and France was represented by Léon Bourgeois. The Allies showed a willingness to permit minor states to participate in the drafting of the League's Covenant which was in marked contrast with their desire

to keep these states out of the discussions on subjects like reparations and the disarmament of Germany. But the minor states did not have an opportunity to make changes in the Covenant. That was the preserve of the Great Powers.

Wilson went to the Peace Conference without any clear ideas about the nature of the peace or international organization. However, he did have one concrete scheme that he wanted incorporated into the Covenant. For him, the primary purpose of the League was to guarantee the territorial integrity and political independence of the member-states, particularly that of the small countries against the ambitions of the great. The idea derived from his experience with the Pan-American Union when, in 1916, he attempted to negotiate a pact with the Latin American republics containing mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity.⁷ Peace could be guaranteed only by the collective action of nations against aggressors; in other words, through collective security.

Central to the war-preventing hopes of the League of Nations, as it was being built at Paris in February of 1919, was the notion that the peace-loving majority could coerce the war-loving minority. The fundamental principle of the notion provided that an attack on any one state would be regarded as an attack on all states.⁸ In the context of Article XI of the Covenant of the League war anywhere was to be the concern of every state.

Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the members of the League or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole League, and the League shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations.⁹

Neutrality and isolationism, therefore, were the antithesis of the concept, since peace was said to be indivisible. Every state thus had the

responsibility to join in a collective arrangement for preventing, or collective measures for defeating, aggressive behaviour that threatened the general peace. Neither the national interest nor the general international interest was given priority. The true national interest of a state was thought to be embodied in the collective interest of maintaining international order.

The "ideal" concept of collective security depended upon a positive commitment by the great mass of states to the value of world peace; the indivisibility of peace required loyalty to the world community. States which constituted the system had to be willing to accept commitments which would involve the sacrifice of their freedom of action or inaction in the most crucial of future situations. They were required to say in advance what they would do. They had to agree to discard ad hoc national judgements, and lock themselves into a course of action from which they would not be permitted to stray. The nation-state had to surrender its traditional control over the elements of national power, and follow the orders of an international agency.

For constitutional democracies this implied the transfer of power to make vital decisions to an outside agency, a process which was difficult to reconcile with the democratic principle that people have the right to change their minds through the constant operation of the mechanism of majority rule. It required the democratic statesmen to follow policies the people may, in the circumstances, not approve. For peoples and governments it meant there must develop an unprecedented degree of confidence in the judgement and good will of foreigners, since the discretionary authority removed from the competence of the state was added to that of the international

organization. Furthermore, the basic requirement of collective security was that it function impartially. It recognized neither traditional friendships nor deep-seated antagonisms; it permitted no alliances with or against other states. Membership in a collective security system involved an alliance with nobody in particular and everybody in general. Above all else, every state had to be willing to entrust its destiny to collective security.¹⁰

But the provisions of the Covenant did not attempt to foster conditions in which this "ideal" concept of collective security could successfully operate. Article V, for example, stated:

Except where otherwise expressly provided in this Covenant or by the terms of the present Treaty, decisions at any meeting of the Assembly or of the Council shall require the agreement of all Members of the League represented at the meeting.

The principle of unanimity enshrined the principle of the national sovereignty of member-states within the Covenant. Although it was qualified by the provision that "matters of procedure" in both bodies could be decided by a majority vote, Article V left it to each member-state to decide whether or not to accept the obligations of the Covenant in specific cases. Moreover, Article XII, which established that "any dispute likely to lead to a rupture" between states would be submitted either to arbitration, judicial settlement or to inquiry by the Council, made it clear that the Covenant was not intended to outlaw war. Indeed, by its terms it legalized war under certain circumstances.¹¹

France saw collective security and the League of Nations as one way to guarantee its frontier with Germany. At the Peace Conference France was determined to reduce Germany militarily and economically so that it could no longer pose a serious threat to French security. The scheme outlined by a special committee created by the French government

to formulate a scheme for a viable international organization put most of its emphasis on sanctions of various kinds and stressed the need for the League to have "at its disposal a military force supplied by the various member States of sufficient strength" and to operate as an effective body.¹² Any measure of French disarmament, unaccompanied by guarantees of assistance, would reduce French military superiority over Germany and open the way for renewed German aggression. A strong international organization with clearly-defined executive powers and military force could give France the assurance of instant help against German aggression. But the French delegates on the League Commission were unable to convince the majority of the Commission's delegates of the soundness of their point of view. Nor were the French successful in preventing the incorporation of the articles on disarmament into the Covenant. To give the French some satisfaction Cecil proposed the establishment of a permanent commission to advise the League Council on military, air and naval questions and on the execution of disarmament schemes.¹³

To the French, therefore, the League as constructed at Versailles was too weak to guarantee France's frontiers against future aggression. But it was hard to see how any sovereign member of the League, least of all France itself, would have been willing to accept in advance the controls such clauses would have entailed. Georges Clemenceau, the French Premier, fought for more tangible help from Wilson and Lloyd George in the form of a guarantee treaty of assistance from the United States and Great Britain against Germany in the event of future German aggression against France. The British and American leaders gave Clemenceau their pledge in return for his renunciation of French claims to the Rhineland.¹⁴ But the United States failed to

ratify the Treaty of Versailles, and the entire arrangement collapsed since British participation had been made carefully conditional upon American ratification of the peace treaty.

Wilson's position on collective security, particularly Article X of the Covenant, encountered opposition from Cecil and the British Dominions. Article X was the cornerstone of the entire collective security system.

The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled.¹⁵

It was the universal guarantee against aggression; Article X was to act as a deterrent. Although Wilson placed great emphasis on the article, its importance was more as a statement of principle than a legal commitment. Nor was it enforceable under the provisions of the Covenant. No provision was included for sanctions; the sanctions of Article XVI applied only to treaties broken under Articles XII, XIII, and XV. Also, the second sentence was so worded as to ensure that concerted action under the article would be practically impossible. The unanimity rule would prevail since the parties to the dispute had the power of veto if they sat on the Council, and the power of the Council was limited to advising member-states what was to be done to fulfill their obligations. Such advice could be ignored with impunity. Finally, Article X was modified to some extent by Article XIX "which provided for the reconsideration by members of the League of Treaties which have become inapplicable."¹⁶

The Canadian delegation¹⁷ was not willing to accept collective security and all that it implied. It would not agree to a systematic

arrangement that would serve to confront would-be aggressors, whoever and wherever, with an overwhelming collection of coercing power assembled by a mass of states. Nor did the delegation accept the concept's assumption of the moral clarity of any situation, the assignability of guilt for the threat to or breach of peace.¹⁸

Canadian objections to Article X were emphatic from the beginning. C. J. Doherty, the Minister of Justice, wrote a lengthy criticism of the draft article to Cecil in January 1919 in which he insisted that "the obligation to guarantee boundaries . . . goes far beyond what the members of the League should be called upon to undertake. It should be restricted to the agreement to respect the boundaries referred to."¹⁹ Doherty resumed the attack a month later in a memorandum he sent to Borden and the other Canadian delegates. Arguing that Article X pledged every member of the League to preserve the territorial status quo established at the Peace Conference, Doherty declared that it would involve Canada, a young undeveloped country, in problems far from home in which it had no interest. The obligation in Article X was direct and absolute, and League members were clearly bound to military action.²⁰

Sir Robert Borden, the Canadian Prime Minister, agreed with Doherty's position. In a detailed and powerful commentary on the proposed Covenant of the League dated March 13, 1919, which was distributed to the members of the League Commission, Borden recommended that Article X be deleted. He emphasized the unreasonableness of a blanket declaration:

- (a) that all existing territorial delimitations are just and expedient, (b) that they will continue indefinitely to be just and expedient, (c) that the Signatories will be responsible therefore . . . There may be national aspirations to which the provisions of the Peace Treaty will not do justice and which cannot be permanently repressed.²¹

The Canadian Prime Minister was unable to secure British aid to have the article deleted in the League Commission. Doherty and Borden raised the question again on April 21 at a meeting of the British Empire delegates. Cecil defended it; he described it as "merely one of the safeguards" in the Covenant, and reassured the Canadians that Canada could not, under the Covenant, be required to take part in any military expedition for League purposes without its consent.²² But Cecil was not pleased with the article, either. Although the attempt at the Peace Conference to have Article X struck out of the Covenant was unsuccessful, it was not abandoned. A new effort was launched by Doherty at the first meeting of the League Assembly in 1920, but was unsuccessful.²³

Apart from Article X of the proposed Covenant of the League of Nations, in general Canadian interest in the major political controversies at the Peace Conference was minimal. The delegation was very interested in the structure and functions of the new international organization which the Conference was setting up and especially in the position Canada would have in the organization.

It involved her equality of status on international bodies, proposed commitments by the members that called for close study, and was intended to include the United Kingdom and the United States, the two great powers by whose policies Canada was always most affected.²⁴

The government wanted Canada to be a member of the new League of Nations so as to preserve and continue the new international role the Dominion had found for itself during the Great War. Separate membership in the League was not a controversial subject at the Peace Conference. The Dominions and India were accepted as original members of the League.²⁵ The Dominions were thus able to express their points of view directly in the international gathering as far as it was possible for any small

state, and at the same time exert direct influence upon one of the major powers.

Eligibility for election to a non-permanent seat on the League Council, though, was another matter. If the "British Empire" was to be a permanent member of the Council, how was the "British Empire" member on the Council to be selected? Were the Dominions automatically included as component parts of the British Empire? Borden's answer to the question was to press for the recognition of separate membership for the Dominions, otherwise it would have meant that the Dominions were inferior in status to all other League members, and would have meant committing the Dominions to the world-wide responsibilities of Great Britain for which they were not prepared if the "British Empire" sat on the Council. Borden pressed his view on the British delegation, and on the first of May, 1919, he discussed the question with Woodrow Wilson. The President "entirely agreed with the view that the representatives of the Dominion were so eligible."²⁶ Borden was also to persuade Lloyd George to take the matter up officially with the United States and France. His view was accepted but the Canadian Prime Minister wanted it in writing. He prepared a memorandum to that effect and had it signed by Clemenceau, Wilson, and Lloyd George on May 6, 1919.

The question having been raised as to the meaning of Article IV of the League of Nations Covenant, we have been requested by Sir Robert Borden to state whether we concur in his view, that upon the true construction of the first and second paragraphs of that Article, representatives of the self-governing Dominions of the British Empire may be selected or named as members of the Council. We have no hesitation in expressing our entire concurrence in this view.²⁷

The general emphasis of the comments and actions of the Dominion leaders at the Peace Conference was upon preserving the long-cherished

rights of individual decision. Besides this was the notion of a League through which wars might be prevented by the provision of means for the peaceful settlement of disputes. Canada accepted membership in the new international organization more for the recognition of its international status than a desire to save humanity. This membership committed Canada to participate in preserving peace beyond its own frontier, and regular involvement in international political crises. Despite the acceptance of membership, it soon became clear that the Dominion was no more prepared to underwrite the security of Europe or any other area than it had formerly been to underwrite the security of the British Empire.²⁸ It was hoped that the new League of Nations would provide general security while asking for only limited and occasional assistance, leaving the Dominion free to pursue social and economic policies so that the problems of growth and change engendered by the war could be solved in a self-determined framework.

A special session called by the Borden government in 1919 to ratify the Treaty of Versailles, which included the Covenant of the League of Nations, opened on September 1. There was considerable criticism and discussion of the treaty even though its provisions could not be altered by unilateral action of the Canadian government. Parliament was not informed of the government's opposition to Article X of the Covenant or of the Canadian delegation's efforts at the Peace Conference to have the article deleted.²⁹ In presenting the treaty to the House of Commons for approval on the following day, Borden made only a passing reference to what had happened in Paris.

The Canadian delegates took exception both in form and in substance to certain of its original provisions. Our views were set forth in a confidential memorandum which I circulated to the members of the Commission who drafted the Covenant and to the representatives of the five great

Allied Powers.. Many of our objections were met in the revised draft; and as to the others we felt that important as we regarded them, they ought not to be accounted of moment in comparison with the supreme purpose embodied in the Covenant.³⁰

An explanation of the Canadian objections "to certain of its provisions," particularly those that were rejected, was not offered. Parliament would have to wait over three years to find out what happened at the Peace Conference.

The Liberal opposition feared that League membership might give Canada new international responsibilities, implicate it in European politics, and prevail over the ultimate authority of the Canadian Parliament. Unwilling to advocate rejection of membership in the League, much of the Liberal criticism on the Covenant was isolationist in tone.³¹ However, the debate confirmed the indications of the first session of 1919 that the Liberals were not agreed amongst themselves on the desirability of Canada's attempting to advance her status and powers as a self-governing nation in the British Empire. D. D. McKenzie, the temporary Liberal House leader, and W. S. Fielding, a former Minister of Finance, were especially worried by the discussion of autonomous Canadian status. McKenzie argued that Canada was not a nation "in the true sense of the term" but part of the British Empire.³² Ernest Lapointe, a prominent Liberal M.P. from Quebec, asked the government if Canada would live up to her obligations as a member of the League and apply sanctions against Great Britain if the League was forced to invoke sanctions against it.³³ On September 11, Fielding and Lapointe proposed an amendment to Borden's resolution:

In giving such approval, this House in no way assents to any impairment of the existing autonomous authority of the Dominion, but declares that the question of what part, if any, the forces of Canada shall take in any war, actual or threatened, is one to be determined at all times as

occasion may require by the people of Canada through their representatives in Parliament.³⁴

Although the Fielding amendment did not reject Canadian participation in the League of Nations or directly conflict with the language of Article X of the League Covenant, its intent was "clearly to minimize any commitment on the part of Canada to take action in opposition to aggression."³⁵

The Borden government was forced to defend Article X before the House of Commons even though the Liberal proposal was consistent with the attitude taken by the Canadian delegation in Paris. But it was also unwilling to give full support to collective security. The leadership of both the government and the opposition sought to minimize Canadian obligations, though each dwelt on slightly different terms, while accepting Canadian membership in the League.³⁶ Fielding's amendment and Borden's resolution were brought to a vote on September 11, 1919. There was no doubt of the outcome of the debate; the opposition amendment was defeated by a government majority of thirty-two.³⁷

Mackenzie King, the newly elected leader of the Liberal party, was not a member of the House of Commons at the time of the debate. King was concerned about the division within his party regarding the Covenant of the League of Nations, and was particularly embarrassed by the colonialism of Fielding and McKenzie. The "Liberal" speeches of Rowell and A. L. Sifton on the government side did not make the views of his two chief supporters any easier to bear.³⁸ He realized that his party would have to move beyond Borden's policy of autonomy or become reactionary in imperial relationships. King dealt with the status of Canada in his address to the House on March 16, 1920, even

though the subject was the treaty of peace with Bulgaria. He glorified the position the Liberal party had taken in bringing Canada to the status of a nation and declared that:

So long as, in the last analysis, all matters pertaining to Canada in her external or inter-Imperial relations are made subject to the approval of this Parliament, so long as no action can be taken of which the Parliament of Canada does not have ample opportunity to approve, we shall feel that to all intents and purposes, we are a nation in the true sense of the word.³⁹

With one stroke, Mackenzie King repudiated McKenzie's position of the previous September and based his position on Fielding's amendment. It was the first indication of the "Parliament will decide" formula.

The new Liberal leader did exhibit some support for the League of Nations. Mackenzie King was insistent on Canadian participation in League affairs as an indication of his country's new international status.⁴⁰ A generalized support of the League, as an organization seeking to prevent war, fitted well with King's desire of being identified with creditable but non-controversial policy subjects. His public statements about Canada's contributions were generally favourable in tone, often self-congratulatory. In private he would, on occasion, express a sentimental and generalized support for the League. "I am heart and soul for a League of Nations, imperfect as the beginnings of its organization must necessarily be," he wrote to Dr. R. C. James in October 1919.⁴¹ As R. M. Dawson points out, King's academic liberal background, his zeal for peace, his interest in social and humanitarian reform, and his experience in labour problems should have predisposed him in favour of the League and of an active role for Canada in the international organization.⁴² He did not believe in the use of force, either in domestic or international affairs, but in the rationality of man. Reason would prevail over force if the

protagonists could discuss their problems in a calm and intelligent atmosphere. Conciliation, mediation, investigation and arbitration, all to be found in the provisions of the Covenant, constituted an "all but impregnable line of defence against international strife."⁴³ Reason, with the aid of an enlightened Public Opinion, would triumph over Force.⁴⁴

However, the Leader of the Opposition had certain reservations about the League, especially Article X, as Borden had. King objected to Article X and was opposed to any attempt to get League members to make new policy commitments or to consider themselves firmly bound by old ones.⁴⁵ Mackenzie King was a politician who was forced to deal with the realities of the Canadian domestic situation and the political implications of collective security. The general attitude of Canadians in the post-war period was one of determination not to become involved in another war. Internationally-minded Canadians, such as N. W. Rowell and Senator Raoul Dandurand, accepted in a vague sort of way the need for all countries to meet together for the common good and for a discussion of common problems. They were willing to see Canada participate in the general discussions in the League Assembly, but they did not want their country to become involved in European problems. The League of Nations was seen as primarily a European institution with its headquarters located in the heart of Europe, preoccupied largely with European problems. It was dominated by European statesmen operating in a realm of affairs in which Canadians had no experience.⁴⁶

There were other reasons for King's opposition to collective security. Constitutionally, the theory of collective security struck at the heart of King's Liberalism and nationalism. Under such a system

the power to make vital decisions on war and peace would be transferred from the nation-state or self-governing Dominion to an international agency. Parliament would no longer control the destiny of Canada. Opposed to imperial centralization of any kind, Mackenzie King was not about to make any concessions with regard to commitments or obligations to the new League of Nations. In this respect King's attitude toward collective security was not essentially different from that of his predecessor, Sir Wilfrid Laurier, toward imperial defence.⁴⁷ King, like Laurier, saw Canada as isolated from the world and, so far as possible, concerned with its own problems. The two men focused their attention on status, not on the role of the Dominion in the larger world.⁴⁸

It was mentioned above, though, that the League could not bind a member-state without its consent, even if Article XVI, which contained the sanctions of the League, was invoked against an aggressor. A member-state which resorted to war in violation of the Covenant was "ipso facto deemed to have committed an act of war against all other Members of the League."⁴⁹ In such a case all member-states were immediately obliged to take diplomatic, financial and commercial sanctions against the aggressor. Thereafter the Council could only "recommend" to League members "what effective military, naval or air" sanctions were to be taken.⁵⁰ The Second Assembly hastily interpreted the "automatic" sanctions of the first paragraph of this article out of the Covenant. Proposed amendments were adopted which ensured that all sanctions under Article XVI would be imposed gradually and partially under the guidance of the Council.⁵¹ Even without the "interpretation" of 1921 each member-state had to decide for itself

whether another state had gone to war in violation of the Covenant.

Thus Canada's sovereignty remained unfettered.

The other factor which determined Mackenzie King's opposition to collective security was the Dominion's links with Great Britain and the United States. He was not willing to place his faith in the League of Nations and at the same time renounce the imperial connection and Canada's friendship with the United States. King was not willing to jeopardize the security of his country for the sake of an untested idea. He had to deal with reality, with the daily problems of governing a developing Canada and maintaining healthy relations with its strongest neighbours and trading partners. The United States did not make the Dominion's position any easier by its rejection of the Treaty of Versailles and the Covenant of the League of Nations in March 1920.

The United States emerged from the Great War as the strongest Power, as was shown in the large role Woodrow Wilson had in the shaping of peace. But a wave of isolationism and disgust with Europe spread over the country; there was an almost overwhelming desire on the part of the American people to return to the pre-war period of "normalcy." But this feeling had little influence on the course of events in Washington. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, an opponent of Wilson's, knew the Senate could not defeat the Covenant - and thus the Treaty of Versailles - on a straight vote. So he resorted to proposing reservations to the Covenant, which would have required the President to return to Europe for further concessions from Lloyd George and Clemenceau. Lodge said he would continue to add reservations until the Covenant was defeated. Wilson's supporters could not accept the Senator's reservations and on March 20, 1920, they defeated its

ratification. Ironically, the most important of the signatories of Versailles was the only one that failed to ratify the treaty.⁵¹

The Senate also refused to accept the tripartite Anglo-French-American guarantee treaty on which Wilson had persuaded Clemenceau to rely. The French felt betrayed; a search for alternatives became in itself an important feature of France's post-war policy. The British government now viewed the League with less enthusiasm. With the absence of the United States from the League the British government considered Article X unworkable and to be tacitly ignored.⁵²

In order to understand Mackenzie King's approach to foreign policy it is necessary to understand his concept of government. While all the basic concepts of nineteenth century liberalism can be found in King's political philosophy, he was incapable of making a coherent presentation of them. When addressing the party faithful he often made the effort and chose liberalism as his topic, but he rarely got beyond commonplace and meaningless platitudes. On one occasion King described liberalism as "the continuous releasing or unlocking of a great onward force . . . an energizing force, a vital force, a force that is forever serving mankind, and it is a force that is ever seeking and finding a wider outlet."⁵³ But this is not to say that Mackenzie King did not have a political philosophy. He was an active practitioner of the art of government, and behind his decisions was a set of ideas.

Mackenzie King did not see government as having a dynamic role in society.⁵⁴ He saw society as a partnership in which all its members had common interests; government was regarded by King as the agent through which these interests could be discovered and accepted. There was no hint of the government giving direction in any of its

policies or putting on the mantle of leadership during a crisis. "Government, in the last analysis, is organized opinion"⁵⁵ and as such had to be carefully nurtured. If his party was securely in office and not menaced by political dissatisfaction Mackenzie King saw little need for forward steps. His decisions were responses to political pressures but they were consistent with King's concept of leadership and with his concept of a liberal society.

King knew that a political party was the instrument of leadership in a democracy. But he did not believe that the job of a party leader was to become a passionate advocate of new causes. Bold and imaginative ventures were invaluable aids in the creation of opinion, but they were luxuries he could ill afford. "Leadership by consensus" was King's approach to party and national leadership.⁵⁶ The Liberal party was a collection of underprivileged groups opposed to privilege and vested interests, all regions, and all social classes. Common interests existed; if liberal policies could be found which furthered these common interests, then the problems would be solved.⁵⁷ This policy of searching for the common interests led one newspaper editor to comment during the 1921 general election:

There is in King's programme something for everybody, a policy for every local interest, a plank for every group, a promise for every individual. Having begun by announcing one policy in the West and a reversal of that policy in the East, he now offers both in the same breath. He is at once a protectionist and a free trader, and an advocate of a tariff for revenue and a champion of industry. He is all things to all men and all at the same time.⁵⁸

But it was not always easy to discover the liberal policy, and after it was discovered it was not always easy to convince the members of all groups that this was the policy that they wanted. King assumed that all "liberally-minded men" could be persuaded to accept these

policies once they were explained; only tact, patience, and time were needed to ease any tensions and make an agreement between these groups possible.⁵⁹ A compromise could always be found through discussion.

To King, a compromise was equivalent to reaching a consensus.

It was not enough for King to reach a decision; he had to make it the policy of the Liberal party. The Cabinet had to be persuaded to accept his views, and then the caucus had to be persuaded to accept the views of the Cabinet. In other words, Mackenzie King believed collective responsibility was the essence of parliamentary government. Thus there had to exist a sense of contribution on the part of every member of the Cabinet.⁶⁰ Mackenzie King informed the House of Commons in 1931 that cabinet government in the British parliamentary system was based on the belief that the best judgement would be formed out of collective wisdom, and would prevent the will of any one individual from dominating a situation.⁶¹

His Ministers were entitled to know in advance any policy King planned to announce, and they were also entitled to question that policy and raise objections to it. But once King stated his understanding of the consensus of the Cabinet there was no further discussion. Collective responsibility did not mean collective enthusiasm; either grudgingly or silently, King's colleagues had to give their consent. When the announcement was made, each Minister was expected to defend the policy for which he was jointly responsible.⁶² When the Liberals were in office the caucus was not utilized as a sounding board to survey public opinion. Mackenzie King assumed that any policy on which his colleagues agreed represented the consensus of liberally-minded men.⁶³ Decisions were reached in Cabinet and the caucus was then persuaded to accept the Cabinet's decisions. In the

realm of external affairs, King's policies were adopted, not always because his colleagues were convinced by the sheer logic of his argument but, in many cases, because they had great confidence in his political judgement.⁶⁴

His conception of society and foreign policy were integral parts of Mackenzie King's political philosophy. While Industry and Humanity provides an insight into King's career as an industrial relations consultant, it also shows how he viewed the world. Nor did his view of the world change appreciably until the final years of his life. King transposed his concept of industrial relations to the political sphere; he saw Canadian society, and the world at large for that matter, as a partnership. He believed that harmony and social progress depended upon Canadians, and all men, recognizing their mutual interests and agreeing upon policies which would promote the common good.⁶⁵ He was a man of deep faith in the essential unity of society; throughout his Industry and Humanity there is a strong belief that society was, in reality, an organic whole. The actions of certain men, nations, and institutions disrupted that unity and released chaos upon the world. Unrest, to King, manifested itself not only in strikes and lockouts but also in world war. Vigorous, impartial, and scientific investigation of grievances and injustice was the way to maintain harmony and promote social progress within Canada and amongst the nations of the world.⁶⁶ He believed that liberally-minded men were capable of seeing beyond their narrow interests to the broader interests of the community and were prepared to make personal concessions and sacrifices to achieve the common good. Reason, not force, would resolve disputes.⁶⁷ This, for King, was the basis of party unity and even of national unity; it was an

unquestioned article of faith underlying his government's policies on a variety of political problems over the years.

Mackenzie King accepted the orthodox political definition of the nation-state: a political organization capable of acting without outside restraint in both domestic and international affairs.⁶⁸ He also recognized that a state's general foreign policy strategy was linked to the nature of its domestic attitudes and social and economic needs. In fact, Mackenzie King saw foreign policy as almost an extension of domestic policy.

Foreign policy, I take it, is in large measure an extension of domestic policy. It depends upon the balance of social and political forces, upon the industrial organization, upon the racial aspirations, upon the whole background of the people's life.⁶⁹

Moreover, Mackenzie King recognized that it was not enough to be right in principle in external affairs. A state must be able to make its policy statements credible, "otherwise it is a paper mache sort of business, only a mask." In the same set of personal notes on guidelines of foreign policy, King argued that it was not sufficient for an individual, "whether he be Prime Minister or Minister of Foreign Affairs, or both combined," to be knowledgeable or interested in foreign affairs. Parliament and the whole people had to be concerned.⁷⁰ In practice, though, he had his own view as to what public opinion was at any given moment. In the realm of foreign affairs King believed he knew what public opinion would be and felt no need to consult his colleagues and followers in advance. His attitude was much the same toward Parliament; decision-making remained in the hands of the government, and external affairs remained Mackenzie King's private preserve. He thus avoided as completely as possible any meaningful discussion of foreign policy in the House of

Commons.⁷¹

King's close identification with the Liberal party and his country made him acutely aware of the ethnic and regional divisions of Canada. He saw Canada as a partnership between French and English Canadians with both partners benefiting from the federal union.⁷² Canada and the Liberal party had been split by the conscription crisis of 1917; when Mackenzie King was elected leader of the party in 1919 he was faced with the problem of re-uniting and re-building it. Domestic and foreign policy reflected his desire to avoid anything that might upset the delicate repair work. For King this meant that each major national decision had to have the support, or at least the acquiescence, of people from each cultural group and each geographical region.⁷³ Although lacking popularity, compromises on foreign policy were the means to achieve the end of national unity. This way a consensus could be reached. By emphasizing status and autonomy, both within the British Commonwealth and the League of Nations, Mackenzie King was able to draw support from various sectors of the Dominion. A foreign policy which proved unpopular in one sector of Canada would aggravate already existing cultural or regional jealousies, and at the same time threaten King's hold on the reins of power by alienating existing or potential political support.

A state's geographic location affects its perception of the external environment.⁷⁴ As with the United States, the Great War adversely affected Canadian attitudes towards European politics, statesmen, and ambitions. It fostered the conviction that the North American continent was fortunately geographically removed from Europe or any other potential crisis spot and could remain aloof from any future struggle. Canadians deliberately isolated themselves behind the

barrier of the Atlantic Ocean as a way of escaping commitments to either the British Commonwealth or the League of Nations.

Three relatively young political leaders, Meighen, King, and T. A. Crerar, paraded themselves on the hustings during the 1921 election. Officially launched on September 1, the campaign was dominated by the themes of protection and conscription.⁷⁵ The League of Nations was not an issue in the election. There had been no party divisions over the League in the House of Commons since the special session of September 1919. Moreover, the fate of a pro-League President in the United States was a warning against making political capital out of Canada's membership in the League.⁷⁶ The returns showed a country deeply divided; no party had been able to win a majority. The Conservatives were reduced to fifty seats, with the Prime Minister and nine of his Ministers suffering personal defeats. T. A. Crerar's Progressives captured sixty-five seats on the prairies and in Ontario. Two Independent Labour candidates were elected to the House as well. Mackenzie King and the Liberals won 117 seats with a member from almost every province. But the bulk of his support came from Quebec where the Liberals carried every seat. King was faced with the dual problem of remaining in office and rebuilding the Liberal party on a national basis. For the first time in Confederation a minority government sat in Ottawa.

Chapter II
THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTY

The Liberals emerged the victors from the 1921 general election and took office under an administration headed by Mackenzie King. The first question King had to deal with in connection with the League of Nations was the composition of the Canadian delegation to the Third Assembly. Writing to the new Prime Minister in February 1922, Sir Herbert Ames, the financial director of the League of Nations, expressed his pride in the League and what it had accomplished since its creation. Ames hoped that the Dominion would send a strong delegation, either non-political or representative of both sides of the House.

If you yourself Mr. Prime Minister, could arrange to lead the delegation it would be at once a great step and, if I may say so, would give you an opportunity that could not be excelled, of getting into direct touch with international questions and world statesmen.¹

In a further letter Ames again urged that Canada send a delegation "as strong and as effective as Parliamentary and Ministerial exigencies will allow." There was no mention this time of the Prime Minister leading the delegation, but the tone of the letter was directed at influencing Mackenzie King to come to Geneva.² Initially refusing to comment on Ames' suggestion, King informed him that he had no intention of going to Geneva in September.³ Instead, W. S. Fielding, Ernest Lapointe, and P. C. Larkin were sent. Fielding was the Minister of Finance and senior member of the Cabinet; Lapointe was the Minister of Marine and Fisheries, but more importantly he was the leading Quebec member in the Cabinet; Larkin was the newly appointed Canadian High Commissioner in London. The Canadian delegation to the Third Assembly was therefore composed of important members of the King administration who had opposed commitments

to the League during the parliamentary session of September 1919. The composition of the Canadian delegation was thus indicative of the attitude that would be taken by the new government of the Dominion at Geneva.

The King government had inherited the unresolved problem of Article X. The Borden and Meighen governments had unsuccessfully attempted to have the article struck from the Covenant at Paris and at the First and Second Assemblies.⁴ But Lapointe was hopeful that whoever represented Canada at Geneva would succeed in this endeavour.⁵ The Department of External Affairs, on the other hand, questioned the wisdom of continuing to press for deletion. In a memorandum to the Prime Minister dated July 20, 1922, Loring C. Christie, the Department's legal adviser, set out the record of government action on Article X. The move to delete the Article had met with no success and Christie felt there was little chance that it would succeed; from that he made certain recommendations on the course that might be followed on the question by the Canadian delegation going to the Third Assembly. He did not recommend that Canada should go so far as proposing to strike out the obligation to respect territorial integrity and the political independence of the Members of the League. The Covenant procedure for League action under Article X was not as binding as was feared. In fact,

the obligation on the part of any Member of the League to take active measures is not at all absolute, since the measures if any to be taken by each Member can only be determined in the future when the occasion arises and as the result of consultation with the Member itself; for though the Council "advises," yet under Articles 4 and 5 the Member in question must be called to the Council, must be admitted to the deliberations, and must be a consenting party before any decision or advice affecting it can bind it; that such procedure is no more in derogation of the principle of state sovereignty and parliamentary supremacy than is the ordinary procedure of international conference.

His analysis, though, did not go far enough. It was indicated above that

Article X by itself could not "trigger" any action on the part of a member-state. In addition, action by a member-state was tied to Article XVI, and here a vote either in the Council or Assembly did not commit it to a decision; each member-state had to decide for itself if it was going to make any commitment.

Christie maintained that the experience of the League had altered the problem confronting the government with regard to the merits of the article and the proposal to delete it. The influence of controversy on the article, and the fact that it would be interpreted and operated as the situation demanded, meant that "the apprehensions voiced by the opponents of the Article will never as a matter of practical politics be realized, even though the text may be open to the construction they fear." If the government was still dissatisfied with the situation Christie advised that it seek a minimum alteration of the text which would produce the desired result while retaining any value that Article X possessed. In view of the reluctance of many Members to undertake any amendment to Article X, Christie felt nothing but a motion or proposal embodying a minimum alteration would have a chance of success in the Assembly. He proposed that the article be altered by the insertion of the word "concerned"; it would take into consideration the geographical position, the political position at the moment, or other reasons which might be fairly regarded as excluding Members from participating in League action in a particular situation.⁶

Copies of the memorandum were sent to Fielding and Lapointe by Christie on July 20.⁷ It is fairly certain that Mackenzie King discussed it with Lapointe before the delegation went to Geneva. They were of the same mind on the question; something had to be done about Article X. The memorandum set out past policy and analysed the reasons for its

failure, it assessed foreign opinion and Article X, and it recommended a course of action other than what had been previously adopted and which Christie felt had the only chance for success. The Prime Minister and his colleagues were made aware that they would have to settle for less than what they wanted. Article X would remain, but they would try to make it ineffective.

When the Assembly convened in September Lapointe made the new government's proposal on Article X. At the meeting of the First Committee (Constitutional Questions) on September 14 Lapointe said that the Canadian government was convinced that it was impossible at the moment to secure the deletion of Article X.

He thought it desirable that the Committee on Amendments, if it was unwilling to propose its delegation, should at least make suggestions with regard to its modification, so as to remove the misunderstandings to which its present wording gave rise.

Moreover, the maintenance of Article 10 prevented several States from adhering to the League of Nations. It therefore appeared necessary, if it were not possible entirely to eliminate this article, to amend it, with the object of obviating any uncertainty as to its scope.⁸

He then proposed that the geographical and political circumstances of each state be taken into account, and that due weight be given to the sovereign authority of Parliament in the various member states of the League.⁹ But Lapointe made it clear that the Canadian government had not changed its attitude, just its tactics. "All those who spoke at the meeting expressed the warmest satisfaction that we were not pressing the Doherty motion There was really very little adverse criticism of our amendment, but much heated criticism of the Doherty motion."¹⁰

Fielding wrote to Mackenzie King before the Members had reacted to the new Canadian proposal. In fact, opposition to the Canadian amendment was very strong. On September 11 Prince Arfa-ad-Dovleh of

Persia told the First Committee that Persia would oppose any move to abrogate or amend Article X.¹¹ Initial comment on the Canadian proposal showed a lack of consensus, but opposition was still strong. The First Committee, faced with the inability to secure unanimous agreement, once again decided to postpone the Canadian proposal, and so recommended to the Assembly. The full Assembly discussed the report of the First Committee on Saturday, September 23. M. Struycken, the Rapporteur, made the report: the Committee had found no substance to the Canadian demand to have Article X deleted. The new Canadian amendment replaced the proposal for the entire deletion of the article. On this basis, the First Committee again proposes that a careful and unhurried examination should be made before a decision is taken on the fate of this article, and on the form in which it is to take its place among the guarantees which the League of Nations can secure to its Members in the interests of world peace and justice.¹²

Only the French and Canadian delegations spoke after the Committee's report had been made. Joseph Barthélemy set out the French position in favour of the retention of Article X and opposition to the Canadian amendment. He gave an eloquent defence of the article that gave France some security, denied there was any ambiguity in the article, and described it as "the pediment of the great temple of our international organization . . ."¹³ Fielding followed the French delegate. He defended the Canadian position in terms somewhat different from those Lapointe had used in the First Committee. Fielding denied that the Canadian delegation was seeking to eliminate Article X entirely, and disassociated his government from the views expressed by Doherty at the first two Assemblies. "I frankly say, I quite admit that you cannot reasonably strike out Article 10 entirely. I think the objections which have been raised to the motion of my illustrious predecessor were

well founded We who represent Canada to-day . . . are not asking /the Assembly/ to eliminate Article 10." He fully supported the contention that Article X was unclear and that Canada only wanted it clarified.¹⁴

Without further discussion the Assembly adopted the First Committee's recommendation to adjourn the Canadian proposal for another year.¹⁵ The division of opinion was more clearly drawn than before. As the Canadian delegation commented in its report:

It did not appear that the proposal had found favour in any quarter in the Assembly. It had, on the contrary, aroused marked hostility. The French representatives were particularly strong in their objections to the elimination of the Article. Many of the smaller nations too were disposed to regard the Article as a protection against aggression and naturally did not look with approval on the proposal to strike it out.¹⁶

Canada responded to these reactions by abandoning a position clearly unacceptable to international opinion. It no longer sought the deletion of Article X, but sought an amendment which might have the effect of minimizing the obligations of states in general and states geographically removed from the scene of potential conflict in particular. Lapointe's amendment to the First Committee was an attempt to implement the recommendations in Christie's July memorandum. Moreover, it is not possible that Lapointe, a Minister of the Crown and a good Liberal, would have acted in such a manner without the prior knowledge and consent of the man who was both Prime Minister and Secretary of State for External Affairs. It would have been contrary to Mackenzie King's concept of ministerial responsibility, that each Minister was responsible for his department and all that occurred within it, and highly uncharacteristic of King's developing relationship with Lapointe. No major shift in tactics to reach a policy objective could be made without Mackenzie King authorizing it.

A new impasse was reached. The Council of the League asked all member governments to submit opinions on the proposed Canadian amendment.¹⁷

In the autumn of 1922 the Prime Minister was more concerned with the Chanak affair and Canadian autonomy within the British Empire than with the League of Nations.¹⁸ During the 1923 session of Parliament King talked about "the unsettled conditions of the present" with respect to international affairs, and about the need "to establish something in the nature of a reasonable stability" but at no point in his remarks was the League of Nations mentioned even in passing.¹⁹ Power's call for Canada's withdrawal from the League evoked no response from Mackenzie King.²⁰ In April 1923 King attended a luncheon with Lord Robert Cecil, Sir Robert Borden, Arthur Meighen, Ernest Lapointe, and others. They discussed international and industrial disputes and the parallel between them, King's favourite comparison, but not the Canadian delegation's actions at Geneva the previous September.

I pointed out it was all education and as men become educated in things nearest to their everyday lives they wd apply them as a matter of course to international relations. - the great thing about the League of Nations, it is teaching all countries a common language - using²¹ language in broad sense, of like concepts and ideas.

The luncheon guests discussed nothing controversial, only an abstract idea which all seemed agreed upon. Cecil was impressed by the interest Mackenzie King showed in the League and the League of Nations Union. Apparently the question of King's travelling to Geneva was discussed; like Ames, Cecil hoped the Prime Minister would go. "It is good to know that you are seriously thinking of coming to Geneva in September, and I am convinced that, if you find it possible to do so, you will not only find it worthwhile, but that you will be rendering a great service to the League."²²

Opposed to advance commitments to military action under Article X the Canadian government also opposed efforts at Geneva in the post-war period to expand and strengthen the collective security provisions in the Covenant. The unsettled state of European politics in 1923 saw renewed emphasis placed upon the need for collective security. France was the principal state concerned with closing the "gaps" in the Covenant since neither alliances nor a punitive policy towards Germany had yielded the desired results; an effort was to be made to stabilize the European situation through further League commitments.²³ The first important move in this direction was the adoption of Resolution XIV by the Third Assembly asking Members to state their views on a proposed Treaty of Mutual Guarantee. The proposed Treaty, the first comprehensive effort to interrelate security and disarmament, envisaged specific guarantees of military assistance in case of attack being made on a regional basis.²⁴

The Council was asked to secure the comments of Member governments upon the principles of the Draft Treaty. Canada was the only member of the British Commonwealth to express its views. Sir Joseph Pope, the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, sent a vague reply which prompted a request for a more specific one.²⁵ Lapointe gave the matter some consideration and wrote to Mackenzie King on June 12, 1923, advising that a new reply should be sent. He wanted King to express the strong support of the Canadian government for a policy of disarmament and its willingness to consider any proposal which would lead to that achievement. But military commitments, in view of Canada's national conditions and geographical position, were out of the question.

Such obligation is intended to be limited in principle to those countries situated in the same part of the Globe. Canada is a country situated in North America. She is

also a nation forming part of the British Empire. It seems difficult to devise any scheme which would reconcile these two basic points.

The Minister of Marine and Fisheries did not feel that Canadians would be prepared to ratify an agreement binding Canada "to help other nations, under our present circumstances."²⁶ Mackenzie King accepted Lapointe's recommendations. Sir Joseph Pope's second communication to the Secretary-General of the League on the Draft Treaty employed much the same language used by Lapointe in his letter to the Prime Minister. Canada rejected the Draft Treaty.

In any case it seems very unlikely that the Canadian people in the present circumstances would be prepared to consent to any agreement binding Canada to give assistance as proposed to other nations and the Government, therefore, does not see its way to a participation in the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee.²⁷

At the same time the government of Mackenzie King was preparing what was to be its final move against Article X. Of those governments that had replied to the Council's request for opinions on the proposed amendment, most were strongly opposed. "Twenty-five replies were received from as many States and communicated to your delegates. An analysis of those replies, while indicating a wide variety of opinion as to the meaning of the article, clearly showed that a large majority of the States were absolutely opposed to any change in the Article"²⁸ Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria were the only European states which welcomed the Canadian amendment. The victors and all the new States, however, were hostile to what they regarded as a weakening of the general guarantee. The reply of the Polish government contained some interesting conclusions:

It is indisputable that the Covenant of the League of Nations imposes upon its Members certain obligations which de facto constitute important restrictions upon the exercise of their sovereign rights The

States which constitute the League of Nations would probably have never consented to all these restrictions if they had not believed that they would find a compensation and a makeweight in the mutual guarantee of their territorial integrity and political independence.²⁹

The fifth answer favourable to the Canadian proposal was from Uruguay.

In his opening speech before the First Committee Sir Lomer Gouin, King's Minister of Justice and Canada's First Delegate to the Assembly, recognized the amount of opposition to his country's proposal. Once again, on September 12, 1923, the First Committee listened to the background of the Canadian proposal, of Canada's attitude to Article X and its actions in the League against it. As Fielding had done the previous year, Gouin based Canada's position on Fielding's House of Commons amendment of 1919. Canada was not motivated by any selfish desire, Gouin told the Committee, and to prove his point he drew upon the Dominion's war record. Beneath his statements was the subtle hint that since Canada entered the war without any hope of territorial aggrandizement, without any thought of augmenting its prestige, at least this much should be done for it by its allies.³⁰ Gouin did not pursue the proposal for an amendment, but accepted membership on a sub-committee which was to draw up an interpretative resolution dealing with the questions raised by the Canadian proposal.

The proposed interpretation was essentially the same as the amendment sponsored by Lapointe in 1922, since it recommended that the Council should take account of the geographical situation and other special conditions in recommending measures to be taken against an aggressor. League members would give serious consideration to Council recommendations, but would have to decide for themselves if Article X had been violated and if any measures, especially military, should be taken. If adopted the resolution would represent the opinion of the

Assembly regarding the meaning of Article X. The language of the article would remain unchanged, leaving it open to other interpretations. But the effect of the interpretation, once adopted, would only be to weaken the League's security system.

The proposed interpretative resolution, though weaker than previous attempts, raised the same conflict between those seeking to maintain and those seeking to weaken the collective security system. Committee discussions in September showed that strong opposition still existed on the part of states like France, Belgium, Finland, and Persia. Some states favoured delaying the matter. At this point Gouin made another concession saying that his government would be satisfied with a majority vote for the resolution. This would serve to show how other League members interpreted the article.³¹ By accepting majority support in the Assembly for the resolution, even if it was defeated by any negative votes, the Dominion was prepared to settle for a "moral victory."

Further discussion by the First Committee on September 19 resulted in both sides accepting a compromise solution on the wording which would avoid any appearance of weakening the legal or moral effect of Article X. A majority of the Committee adopted the revised Canadian resolution.³² M. Rolin, Rapporteur for the First Committee, presented the report of the Committee on the Canadian proposal to the Assembly on September 24.

It is in conformity with the spirit of Article 10 that, in the event of the Council considering it to be its duty to recommend the application of military measures in consequence of an aggression or danger or threat of aggression, the Council shall be bound to take account, more particularly of the geographical and of the special conditions of each State.

It is for the constitutional authorities of each Member to decide, in reference to the obligation of preserving

the independence and the integrity of the territory of members, in what degree the Member is bound to assure the execution of this obligation by employment of its military forces.

The recommendations made by the Council shall be regarded as being of the highest importance, and shall be taken into consideration by all the Members of the League with the desire to execute their engagements in good faith.

Rolin told the Assembly that the resolution was not an amendment but an interpretative resolution. Regardless of the success of the resolution, once it was accepted by a majority of delegates it would have great authority from a moral point of view and would "give the Canadian delegation all it asked."³³

Sir Lomer Gouin addressed the Assembly the following day. With his comments conciliatory in tone, Gouin told the delegates that the interpretative resolution contained no fundamental change in Article X, and was accepted by all legal and League authorities. He requested that those Members who did not like the resolution abstain from voting. "in this way we should obtain the authentic interpretation of which the members of the Amendments Committee spoke in 1921."³⁴ The Canadian delegate was followed by Prince Arfa of Persia who restated his country's opposition to the Canadian proposal, stating unequivocally that Persia would be obliged to vote against the proposed interpretation.³⁵ Several delegates, including the French and the British, voiced their support of the resolution. Panama was the only other country to voice its support of the Persian position. Gouin pressed for a vote, refusing to let the Persian delegate communicate with his government.³⁶

Of the fifty-two votes cast when the question was called at the end of the debate on September 25, only a small majority of the Members voted for the Canadian resolution. Twenty-nine votes were

cast for the resolution, but twenty-two states showed their opposition by abstaining while only Persia actually cast a negative vote. All of the Commonwealth delegations and those of all the major Powers in the League voted for the resolution. The President of the Assembly declared that the proposed resolution was neither adopted nor rejected "because it cannot be argued that, in voting as it has done, the Assembly has pronounced in favour of the converse interpretation."³⁷

Canada's four-year struggle in the Assembly, as well as her efforts in Paris at the Peace Conference, seemed to result in a rather meaningless vote.³⁸ The Canadian delegation, though, felt that its efforts had met with success, especially when the voting pattern was analyzed. The resolution had been effectively approved. In his letter to Mackenzie King on October 1, 1923, Gouin wrote:

As you may have learned by the newspapers, we have finally succeeded in obtaining a pronouncement on our proposals concerning Article 10 of the Covenant. It is true that Persia voted against the Interpretative Declaration, but that fact in no way affects the question. We know now that the Great Powers and all the Members of the Council shall interpret that famous Article 10 in the sense of the amendment proposed by our colleague, Mr. Lapointe. Even if Persia had voted with the 29 States who declared themselves in favour of the Interpretative Declaration for which the Society of Nations shall be indebted to Canada,³⁹ that Declaration would have no more force than it has now.

In their official report on the work of the Fourth Assembly, the Canadian delegates expressed a similar opinion. They felt that, under the circumstances, a satisfactory answer had been given to the question.⁴⁰ Canadian insistence that its interpretation had been accepted continued through the years. Replying to the American invitation to become one of the original parties to the Kellogg-Briand Pact, Mackenzie King wrote to the United States Minister that "it was on the initiative of Canada that the Fourth Assembly, with a single negative vote, accepted the

interpretative resolution."⁴¹

The purpose of the Canadian initiative at Geneva had been to weaken the force and effect of Article X. Initially, the goal was sought by advocating the deletion of the article. The Liberal government, convinced that such measures would only fail, took a less direct approach by first seeking an amendment and then an interpretation. At both the Third and Fourth Assemblies the Canadian delegation emphasized the right of states to decide individually what they would do to oppose aggression. Both Ottawa and Geneva recognized as absurd the claim that the meaning of Article X was unclear, and that only the needed clarification was being sought. Regardless of the means to be used, Canada's intention was to undermine as completely as possible the essence of Article X, the interdependence of states.

The Canadian press was not really interested in the League of Nations or international affairs, which was reflected in the amount of news coverage given and the editorial expression made by those papers which either supported or opposed the League. Very simply the Canadian press was more interested in domestic news. Coverage of affairs at Geneva during the final disposition of the interpretative resolution on Article X in 1923 leaves no doubt of the lack of interest in the League. "Both A.P. and C.P. carried the news in their cables but less than half of the Canadian dailies gave it any space. Only the Montreal Gazette made much editorial fuss over it."⁴²

The Draft Treaty of Mutual Guarantee was resurrected at the Fourth Assembly as the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance. Instead of being endorsed by the Assembly it was sent to governments for comment. At no time did Canada participate in the discussions leading to the Treaty's preparation. Predictably, once submitted for comment, Mackenzie

King rejected it. The Canadian reply was a restatement of the government's arguments against anything resembling Article X together with a defence of Canadian parliamentary supremacy over the fulfillment of obligations, regardless of whether or not Canada had a representative on the Council with a veto.⁴³ The British Empire stood united in its opposition to the Treaty.

Little attention was paid to League matters in the House of Commons when it resumed sitting in 1924. Mackenzie King was more interested in the issues of Canadian autonomy, the Lausanne Treaty, and imperial relations in general than he was in discussing anything to do with Geneva.⁴⁴ Nor did the members of parliament press the government on foreign policy. The majority of backbenchers neither had nor wanted information on Canada's role in the League. The Select Standing Committee on Industrial and International Affairs, established by King in 1924, never functioned in its latter capacity.⁴⁵ In the perfunctory debates on the League estimates only a handful of members from both sides of the House participated on a regular basis, and only J. S. Woodsworth and Henri Bourassa ever discussed Canadian policy at Geneva.⁴⁶ The cost of the League of Nations to the Canadian taxpayer was the only aspect of the League which interested those who sat in the House of Commons.

The matter of Canada's representation at Geneva was a recurrent topic, a source of irritation for Mackenzie King. Writing from London, N.W. Rowell urged him to attend the next meeting of the Assembly.

It would be a great thing for Canada and a real help to the Assembly. I appreciate the burdens and responsibilities which you are carrying but in my opinion the firm re-establishment of peace in Europe and the consequential restoration of economic stability would do more to promote the prosperity of the farmers of Canada and with that of all Canada than any possible measures of a domestic character which you can devise.⁴⁷

King had no intention of leaving Canada to attend the upcoming meeting of the League Assembly. He argued that his long absence in England in 1923 had prevented him from addressing "any portion of the Canadian electorate during either the summer or fall months, and, for that matter, winter months as well." Faced with his responsibilities as party leader, he could not go abroad since it "would be up to his colleagues to represent Canada's interests as he had every confidence in them."⁴⁸

The outcome of the Fourth Assembly and the rejection of the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance were not the final attempts to strengthen the collective security system of the Covenant. The British Labour government, the major factor in the Treaty's rejection, felt some responsibility for proposing an alternative means for settling the problem of French security. At the Fifth Assembly Ramsay Macdonald, the British Prime Minister, sponsored a set of elaborate proposals for the maintenance of peace, a "Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes," known as the Geneva Protocol. In short, it capped the twin pillars of security and disarmament through compulsory resort to arbitration. The Protocol placed primary emphasis upon the compulsory arbitration of all disputes not settled peacefully by other means, provided for military measures on a regional basis against any state resorting to war rather than arbitration, and would only come into effect when a disarmament conference adopted a general plan for the reduction of armaments. Aggression would be the mere fact of refusing to accept arbitration.⁴⁹ However, the Protocol did nothing to buttress the powers of the League Council under Article XVI of the Covenant or to make military sanctions obligatory. Thus it did not go as far as the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance in satisfying French demands for security. But the Geneva Protocol did maintain the peace settlement of

1919 and, in particular, its territorial arrangements.

In other words, the Protocol accentuated what was afterwards attacked as one of the weaknesses of the Covenant: its tendency to identify security with the maintenance of the 1919 settlement, and its failure to provide adequate machinery for the revision of the settlement.⁵⁰

The Protocol was opened for signature when it was presented to the Assembly on October 1, 1924. European and South American delegations were very favourable to it; only the Canadian delegation expressed doubt and hesitation. Senator Raoul Dandurand, the Dominion's First Delegate, assured the Assembly that Canada had studied the Protocol with sympathy and that the connection between the chief pillars of the Protocol, namely arbitration, security and disarmament, had long been accepted and applied in Canada. The International Joint Commission was the North American approach to arbitration, and the Canadian-American border of three thousand miles was disarmed. The Assembly was told that the sacrifices made during the war were evidence of Canada's loyalty to the League and its ideals. But the Canadian government was hesitant, even reluctant, to commit itself to the Protocol.

The heavy sacrifices to which we agreed for the re-establishment of peace in Europe led us to reflect on what the future might hold in store.

May I be permitted to add that in this Association of Mutual Insurance against fire, the risks assumed by different States are not equal. We live in a fire-proof house, far from inflammable materials. A vast ocean separates us from Europe.⁵¹

The Canadian government was unwilling to become directly involved in guaranteeing territorial boundaries in Europe. It was "not thought expedient at the present time," Dandurand declared, for Canada to sign the Protocol.⁵²

On his return to Canada Dandurand insisted that he "have a quiet talk" with the Prime Minister on the subject of the Protocol prior to

the Cabinet meeting.⁵³ King's response was to invite the Senator and O. D. Skelton, the Counsellor to the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, to lunch on November 26, 1924. That same afternoon the Cabinet gave some consideration to the Geneva Protocol. But there is no record of either discussion, nor did King record in his diary what position, if any, he took on it.⁵⁴

Skelton and the Prime Minister had met in January 1922. Impressed by Skelton's address on foreign policy to the Canadian Club in Ottawa, King brought him into the Department of External Affairs in 1924 and on Sir Joseph Pope's retirement in February 1925 made him Under-Secretary.⁵⁵ Skelton, formerly a professor of political science and Dean of Arts at Queen's University in Kingston, had a strong identification with the Liberal party. Author of a laudatory biography of Sir Wilfrid Laurier, he frequently wrote on the League of Nations in the Queen's Quarterly during the early 1920's. He supported the League as a primarily conciliatory and arbitral means of settling disputes. As long as sanctions were not used for imperialistic adventures he was not opposed to their application by willing nations. Canada's part in world affairs had to be modest and intelligent, guided by the size of its population and domestic concerns and by the fact that Canada was a young member of the international community.⁵⁶ But it appears that Skelton became disillusioned with the League some time after the Manchurian crisis, for after that episode he felt that the League was no longer countering the ambitions of any of the great powers.⁵⁷ Skelton and King held views on foreign policy that were remarkably similar. During the inter-war period their views on the League of Nations were almost identical, but they did not change in step.

Six days after the Protocol was recommended to the governments by the Assembly the Labour government in Britain was defeated in a general election. The election at the end of October returned the Conservatives under Stanley Baldwin to power. The Geneva Protocol was less to its liking than the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance had been to the Labour government. But it hoped to make the Dominions appear responsible for the Protocol's rejection by uniting the Empire on the question. "We conceive it to be essential in regard to a problem of this magnitude the Empire should have a single policy and that such a policy can only be determined as a result of personal consultation between Ministers."⁵⁸ Skelton, wary of Downing Street, warned Mackenzie King of the danger.⁵⁹ On December 28, 1924, King cabled his reply. He agreed on the desirability of having a similar attitude on the Protocol, but he was against a single Empire policy and felt that holding an Imperial Conference thereon was impracticable. Parliament was to reconvene in early February and this, King argued, made it impossible for any Minister to leave Canada.⁶⁰ In other words, Mackenzie King refused to be associated in any way with a British rejection of the Geneva Protocol.

As the new year arrived the King government was faced with a serious problem in its foreign policy: where did it stand on the Geneva Protocol and why? In an analysis of the Protocol dated January 8, 1925, Skelton repeated the familiar contrast "in the angle from which questions of armament and security are approached by a country like Canada, fortunate in its comparative isolation and friendly neighbours, and by many of the countries of Europe, heirs to centuries of feuds and fears . . ." Skelton described the Protocol as a "League of European Victors . . . , distinctly a European affair. It would not protect Canada an iota. It is designed to safeguard the territorial

gains of the winners in the world war" ⁶¹ On the evening of Monday, February 2, 1925, Mackenzie King, Lapointe, Dandurand, Skelton, and other colleagues and advisers gathered at Laurier House to discuss Skelton's memorandum and the Protocol. The discussion, which went on into the early hours of February 3, revolved around the issue of applying economic sanctions against the United States. The obligations under the Protocol seemed heavier than those in the Covenant. Although he had been instructed by his government to withhold Canada's signature to the Protocol at Geneva, Dandurand privately defended it against the majority view in Ottawa. ⁶² But in view of possible problems with the United States and "questions of domestic significance" the meeting decided not to approve it. ⁶³

A week later Parliament reconvened. Although the government had decided it could not support the Protocol there was not even a passing reference to that decision in the Speech from the Throne. Arthur Meighen, the Leader of the Opposition, queried the government on its attitude toward the Protocol. But he also refused to make any comments on it except to say that, due to the present state of conducting international relations, it would be a grave step by Canada to contribute its own view which would "virtually advise Great Britain to underwrite the security of the world." ⁶⁴ In reply, King remarked on the "means of correspondence" between Ottawa and London and the fact that the opening of Parliament made it impossible for members of the government to be absent at this time. The House was told that the governments of the Empire had not disposed of the matter in any final way, so no allusion had been made to the subject in the Speech from the Throne. "The government," said King, "will make its position known at the right time, and ample opportunity will be given to hon. members to

discuss the protocol in all its bearings."⁶⁵

In the meantime, the Geneva Protocol was referred to an interdepartmental committee for review. Composed of members from five government departments under Skelton's chairmanship, the committee made its report on March 2, 1925. The report recommended the rejection of the Protocol because "it would not be in the interests of Canada, of the British Empire, or of the League itself, to adhere to the Protocol, and particularly to its rigid provisions for the application of economic and military sanctions in every future war." The fact that the United States was neither a member of the League nor would be a party to the Protocol's obligations was another argument for its rejection. Any attempts to enforce the sanctions against the United States would be disastrous for Canada. The committee advised the government that, in rejecting the Protocol, it should express its willingness "to accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice" and agree to participate in a disarmament conference.⁶⁶ King accepted these recommendations since they were in accord with the conclusions he had arrived at early in February.

The British government pressed for a single policy against the Protocol. Messages from the Dominion governments and India indicated that the Empire was not prepared to accept the Protocol, from which London concluded there would be "no objection to Mr. Chamberlain, in the course of the proceedings at the Council next week, making a general statement to that effect."⁶⁷ On March 8 Ottawa informed London that it had no objection to Chamberlain making such a general statement to the Council, but it intended to send its own statement to the Secretary-General.⁶⁸ On the afternoon of March 7, the Cabinet had a long

discussion on foreign affairs. "All were agreed on our keeping our separate identity in the League to the fore."⁶⁹ So, on March 9, 1925, Mackenzie King authorized the despatch of a note stating Canada's opposition to the Geneva Protocol without consulting the Cabinet because, for him, his Ministers had reached a consensus allowing him to act.⁷⁰ At no time was Parliament given a chance to decide.

On March 12, three days after Mackenzie King's communication to the Secretary-General, Parliament was belatedly given its opportunity to discuss the Geneva Protocol. The Prime Minister presented to the House of Commons a copy of the Protocol and a report of the League committees which had dealt with the matter. The House was also informed of the statement being made by the British to the Council with respect to the position taken by the British government and the position of the Dominions on the Protocol. King also read the communication of March 9. At no point in his address did Mackenzie King offer an explanation for his failure to advise or consult Parliament. Strangely enough, King's actions and statements were not questioned. Meighen's only request was that the documents pertaining to the discussion which led to the Protocol be made available to the House. Woodsworth asked the government when its rejection of the Protocol would be discussed by the House. King could not give him an exact time.⁷¹

Parliament never did discuss the government's rejection of the Protocol, for it was never raised for debate. The Geneva Protocol had defined aggression, and affirmed the concept of collective security. But the Canadian government was very reluctant to endorse any proposal which involved commitments to economic or military sanctions. Moreover, Mackenzie King hoped that by avoiding a common Empire policy or voice at Geneva Canada's relations with the United States would put "us in

a position where we can render Br. Empire greater service by being an interpreter of each to /the/ other."⁷² The greatest interest of Canada in the League of Nations continued to centre on its usefulness in establishing an independent international status for the Dominion. Formal questions of status at Geneva posed no problems, though, since Canada had been a full member of the League from its beginning. Specific recognition of Canada's status, however, was welcomed and on two occasions actively sought.

In late March 1925, Skelton wrote to Mackenzie King requesting that he consider "the advisability of some steps being taken to sound out the possibility of a Canadian representative being chosen as the President of the Assembly, at its next meeting." Skelton pointed out that Sir Eric Drummond, the League's Secretary-General, believed a strong possibility existed of a Canadian being chosen as President, with the strong support of the British Empire and French delegations. He concluded:

It is clear that for a good many years to come there is no likelihood of Canada or any other Dominion being accorded a place on the Council, even though their right to be considered has been formally acknowledged. This being so, there is no better way of indicating the distinct position of the Dominions in the Assembly than by the choice of a Dominion representative as the presiding officer of the Assembly.

The notation at the bottom of the letter, dated April 18, recorded Mackenzie King's agreement to the move and instructions to act accordingly.⁷³ The office of the President of the Assembly did not mean increased involvement on the part of the holder's country in League affairs since the President's functions and responsibilities were much like those of the Speaker of the House of Commons. The office posed no threat to Canada or the government of which Mackenzie King

was the head, so he endorsed Skelton's proposal.

The Under-Secretary then wrote to Walter Riddell, the Canadian Advisory Officer in Geneva, requesting that he discuss with Sir Eric Drummond the possibility of Raoul Dandurand being elected President of the Sixth Assembly.⁷⁴ Skelton informed the Prime Minister that the Secretary-General would give Dandurand "his hearty support" although there would be candidates from Denmark and Yugoslavia. While in London Drummond had talked to Austen Chamberlain, and the latter would support Dandurand's election. Skelton concluded:

There seems, then, a good prospect of the Senator's election, which would be a feather both in Canada's cap and in his own. At the same time, it is going to make it all the more important to have a strong representation, if the Senator is to be in the chair and so unable to take part in the general debates or committee meetings.⁷⁵

The selection of Dandurand was agreed to by Austen Chamberlain and Aristide Briand, the British and French Foreign Ministers.⁷⁶ Riddell, in his report to Skelton on Dandurand's inaugural speech in September, again put the emphasis on status.⁷⁷

Canada's election to the Council of the League of Nations was, for Mackenzie King, another matter. The question of Dominion representation on the Council was closely linked with the Council's expansion in 1926 as a result of Germany's entry into the League and its seating as a Permanent member of the Council. The presence of Germany as a Permanent member on the Council was obstructed by some member-states, particularly Poland, Spain, and Brazil. Eventually the question of the composition of the Council was referred to a committee, which proposed that the number of non-permanent seats be raised from six to nine.⁷⁸ Mackenzie King recognized the implications of the Council's enlargement. The Prime Minister informed Riddell that he was not

convinced that the Council should be enlarged even by increasing the number of elective members for it "would make necessary considerable claims all groups including Dominions" ⁷⁹ Dandurand, though, defended the right of the Dominions to be elected to the Council when the subject was discussed by Sir Austen Chamberlain and representatives from the Commonwealth during the proceedings of the Sixth Assembly and during Assembly meetings in March 1926 between the Locarno negotiations.

Commenting on the meeting in a letter to Skelton, Dandurand wrote:

I was precluded from explaining that Canada cannot accept to be found by all the decisions of the Council and to be hampered in its action when these same matters come before the Assembly.

Moreover the jurisdiction of the Council is a very wide one and Canada's Parliament will always insist on interpreting itself its own obligations arising out of the Covenant.⁸⁰

Skelton had covered the same ground in a memorandum in January 1925.⁸¹

The government was concerned that, in enlarging the Council, the Dominions' eligibility for membership would be ignored. Sir George Foster, the First Delegate to the Seventh Assembly, was instructed to press his country's claim "if representation from other countries make it appear that practically all the seats are to be definitely assigned, to various groups or areas, and the selection of any other State in future thus shut out."⁸² Foster addressed the Assembly on September 15 and reminded the delegates of the Dominions' right to be elected to the Council.

So far as my country and the other members of the British overseas countries are concerned, we have not hitherto made and are not now making any claim for a seat on the Council of the League. But it is pertinent, and I think it is right at this stage to say to this Assembly and to the League itself, that we consider that we have equal rights to representation on the Council and otherwise with every one of the fifty-six Members of the League of Nations, and that we do not propose to waive that right.⁸³

The issue lay dormant until the spring of 1927. Lapointe began to urge that Canada be a candidate for a non-permanent seat. He was, Dandurand wrote to Skelton in May of that year,

most positive as to the necessity for Canada, playing fully its role in the League as a full fledged nation. He could not admit a faint-hearted and a limited cooperation. He thought we should play the game and thoroughly or else withdraw completely. He added that our presence in the Council with our right of dissidence and veto made for our protection while increasing our responsibility. He saw a great advantage in having Canada in the lime-light before the world as it would affirm and settle our political status and give us considerable publicity.⁸⁴

The Prime Minister, on the other hand, was apprehensive about too much Canadian involvement in international affairs if Canada were elected to the Council. He would have been very satisfied if the question had been left alone, or an acknowledgement made that the Dominions were eligible for election to the Council as Foster had pressed for the previous summer. Mackenzie King's main concern on the issue was the domestic political consequences.

We are just as wise not to get too far into European politics (& entanglements). It wd mean French Canadian representation & Canada's siding on the League against England possibly, which wd raise a major political issue here. - If not likely to differ with Eng. then no need for separate representation. Better avoid mistakes.⁸⁵

An active role in League affairs would alienate political support from various sections across the country. Given Quebec's attitude to the Empire, the League, and external affairs in general and English Canada's reaction to it, King was aware that a French Canadian representing Canada on the League Council would only strengthen present attitudes. Such representation on the Council would weaken his support in Quebec since it would be regarded there as increased involvement, and would be interpreted in English Canada as a surrender to French

Canadian influence. Nor did the Prime Minister want to be put in a position of potential opposition to British policy, with its political consequences in Canada. A Council seat meant the acceptance of certain commitments.⁸⁶

Initially, Skelton was of the same opinion as his chief; he did not want Canada to become involved in European affairs, even for the sake of being "in the lime-light" and for "considerable publicity." The work of the Council was almost exclusively European in nature. There was also a problem, as far as Skelton was concerned, of representation in Geneva by Canadian public men. A seat on the Council would require a Minister to travel to Europe three or four times a year for three years. Such absences would not be good for the effectiveness of the government and would place too much pressure on the individual involved. The Under-Secretary, though, had not spoken to Mackenzie King on the subject for many months.⁸⁷ Skelton's views began to change over the spring. He became concerned about the eligibility of the Dominions for election to the Council. If the Dominions did not press their claim for a seat on it there would never be another opportunity. They would be permanently excluded. Skelton saw no hope, however, of the Irish Free State successfully leading the way.

If it were clear that the Irish Free State, which will be a candidate if we do not, could be elected, there would be something to be said for our standing aside for the present term, but it may be more doubtful whether in view of probable British opposition, they could obtain a seat.⁸⁸

Lapointe and Skelton began to pressure the Prime Minister to agree to Canada standing for election. The Irish wanted to know one way or the other so they could plan accordingly. From Geneva Lapointe sent a strongly worded telegram urging a favourable decision.⁸⁹ In a memorandum to his chief dated July 13, 1927, Skelton argued in favour of

the move. As a "disinterested outsider" Canada could provide an objective opinion on issues before the Council. More important was the "definite and crowning recognition of the distinct status of the Dominion" which the election would ensure while the veto Canada would possess as a Council member protected it against undue involvement. There was some difficulty in having a Minister represent Canada on the Council for three years, but the problem was not insuperable. Moreover, a possible conflict between the French and British was not likely with Raymond Poincaré and Lord Curzon not directing the foreign policy of their respective countries. Skelton repeated the argument against stereotyping the rotation of the Council's seats, and felt that the Irish candidature would not be successful because with the murder of Kevin O'Higgins the attention of the Dublin government would be distracted. Skelton concluded his memorandum thus:

Mr. Lapointe adds a good deal of weight to the arguments of clinching Dominion status and to the prestige that would attach to the Government

Under all the circumstances, I am inclined to think that we should go in for election and face any extra work and responsibilities that may be involved.⁹⁰

The situation was becoming critical; time was running out. Unless Canada put forward its claim almost immediately, decisions and moves at Geneva would decide the issue.⁹¹ Lapointe added to the tension. Even though he asked for an opportunity to discuss Council membership with King before a final negative decision was reached, and Mackenzie King agreed to delay his decision until he spoke with Lapointe,⁹² the latter would not sail for Canada until the thirteenth or twentieth of August.⁹³ Senator Dandurand had a conversation with King in August about the coming meeting of the Assembly during which they discussed the question of a Council seat for Canada.

Je lui représentai qu'au contraire le Canada serait alors en meilleure posture pour la surveillance de ses intérêts; que le Conseil devait être unanime pour réclamer de certaines nations des contributions en hommes et en argent lors d'un conflit qui, en vertu du Pacte, imposerait au Conseil l'obligation d'agir contre un perturbateur de la paix.⁹⁴

The Senator wrote to Lapointe, giving an account of the conversation.

Lapointe was also informed of the Irish message received on August 11.⁹⁵

The Minister realized that there was no time left, a decision had to be made. So his reply on August 12 reiterated his previous arguments in favour of Canada standing for election to the Council. He advised the Prime Minister to give the Irish government that answer.⁹⁶ Mackenzie King was neither convinced the move was wise nor was he willing to make the decision so many people wanted him to make. But he would not differ with Lapointe. "I think it is a mistake, as being unnecessary, unduly pressing our individual status as a nation, and inviting differences; but a cleavage with Lapointe on a matter on which he feels deeply would be more unfortunate in the long run."⁹⁷ Reluctantly, King accepted the majority view and authorized the Canadian delegation to announce Canada's candidacy.⁹⁸

The balloting took place on September 25. Five definite candidates competed for the available three non-permanent seats on the Council. Forty-nine votes were cast, twenty-five constituting a majority, the three highest taking seats. Canada won the third seat with twenty-six votes. The Dominion received the solid vote of the British Empire delegations, Northern and Central Europe, and other votes. Skelton, for one, was pleased with Canada's election.⁹⁹ The Canadian delegates, in their report on the Eighth Assembly, regarded the selection of Canada as "a definite answer to the doubts expressed some years ago as to whether all 7 members of the Commonwealth represented

in the League could be full-fledged and equal members."¹⁰⁰

The election brought Canada into direct contact with the discussions on a general agreement for the reduction of armaments. As a member of the Council, Canada was entitled to representation on the Preparatory Commission for the proposed general disarmament conference.¹⁰¹ The Dominion was also represented on a sub-committee on arbitration and security. Walter Riddell, who sat on the Security Committee for Canada, was instructed by Mackenzie King to emphasize the "value /of/ conciliation and investigation as distinct from traditional arbitration."¹⁰² Riddell was to reiterate Canada's opposition to sanctions. "Most effective sanction whether in international or industrial disputes is force of informed and focussed public opinion." The irony of the statement lies in the very fact that Mackenzie King was unwilling to keep the public well informed. The Prime Minister avoided as completely as possible any meaningful discussion of foreign policy in Parliament and his very few public statements on the subject were little more than empty rhetoric couched in cliches. The reality behind the "Parliament will decide" formula was quite different from what the phrase appeared to mean.

Being on the Council, though, did not mean that Canada was taking a greater interest in League affairs. On May 14 and 16, 1928, Woodsworth tried to question the Prime Minister on whether the government, as a member of the League Council or Assembly, was taking any action on the Sino-Japanese situation. King refused to take any stand or make any sort of statement on government policy when he replied. He held Britain responsible for initiating League action and China responsible for making "some representations to the League of Nations." Mackenzie King felt that Canada had no special responsibility to take any action

while other nations did nothing.¹⁰³ In other words, Canada would follow the British lead.

In 1928 Mackenzie King made an important trip to Europe, a year after Canada had been elected to the League Council and in time for him to join with other national leaders in Paris for the signing of the Kellogg-Briand Pact. The Pact repudiated a war of aggression as an instrument of national policy, but it did not outlaw war in any legal sense. It recognized the right of self-defence as inherent in international affairs and involved no interference with the obligations assumed under the Covenant of the League, the Locarno agreements, or any previous treaty. It was nothing but a declaration of intent, without an enforcing agency, and sanctions were noticeably absent from the Pact's approach to the solution of disputes.¹⁰⁴ The fact that the Pact was only a "verbal flourish" with no suggestion of sanctions against those signatories who broke their promise to renounce war made it very attractive to Mackenzie King. But the Prime Minister's approval went deeper. It did not conflict "either in the letter or in the spirit" with the League Covenant. Moreover, he regarded it as the logical consequence of Canada's efforts against collective security, and specifically the outgrowth of the Dominion's success against Article X.

Canada has always opposed any interpretation of the Covenant which would involve the application of these sanctions automatically or by the decision of other states. It was on the initiative of Canada that the Fourth Assembly, with a single negative vote, accepted the interpretative resolution . . . indicating that it is for the constitutional authorities of each state to determine in what degree it is bound to assure the execution of the obligations of this Article by employment of its military forces.

King also recognized that it was an attempt to draw the United States closer to international co-operation.¹⁰⁵

The Prime Minister was very reluctant to address the Assembly when he arrived in Geneva, but he did so on the afternoon of September 7, 1928. The speech was an encore of what the Assembly had endured from previous Canadian delegates. Mackenzie King spoke of the meeting of nations, the influence of public opinion, the importance of the history of Canadian-American relations to European affairs, the similarity of the Rush-Bagot Agreement and the Kellogg-Briand Pact, and Canada's love of peace and friendliness to all nations.

When I say that Canada is behind the League of Nations in its efforts to further and maintain international peace, I speak for no party or class or section, I speak for the whole of Canada. I speak equally for the whole of Canada when I say that our experience leads us to favour, in so far as Canadian questions are concerned, the reference to arbitration of all international disputes of a judicial or legal nature, and the settlement by methods of conciliation or arbitration of all other differences that may arise between Canada and any other nation.¹⁰⁶

The speech sounded nice, but Mackenzie King spoke a great deal less than the historical truth. The International Joint Commission, established in 1909, was not, in practice, a means of solving all disputes between neighbours as Canadians suggested at Geneva. Canadians themselves rejected any such enlargement of the Commission's scope in 1923.¹⁰⁷ The record of Canadian-American relations was scarcely one of peaceful friendship.

On two separate occasions soon after his return to Canada, King spoke publicly on the League of Nations and its work. Both speeches contained the same sentiments which he had expressed in Geneva, altered only by his comparing the objectives and ideals of the League to the teachings of Christianity.¹⁰⁸ But his addresses, as those at Geneva "read by representatives of China, Netherlands and Sweden respectively," were nothing more than generalities and platitudes.¹⁰⁹

King treated the League with indifference and neglect; his address to the Assembly reflected it. He said nothing of importance. He gave it verbal support because he did not see it as a threat; the interpretative resolution in 1923 had seen to that. The Prime Minister merely engaged in the rhetoric of support for the League of Nations and gloried in what he described as its contributions to world peace. The onset of the Great Depression in 1929 brought an end to Mackenzie King's nine years of power. Reacting to rising unemployment, decreasing prices, drought on the prairie, and government inaction in the face of worsening economic conditions, the general election of 1930 saw Canadians replace King and the Liberals with R. B. Bennett and the Conservatives. King would spend the next five years in Opposition, but would be returned to power on a wave of electoral disenchantment with Bennett's handling of the economic situation.

Chapter III

THE DOGS OF WAR

The first full-scale violation of the treaties on which the interwar security system rested occurred in the Far East. It was followed in rapid succession by the Gran Chaco War between Paraguay and Bolivia, by Adolf Hitler's repudiation of the limitation on armaments imposed on Germany by the Treaty of Versailles, by Italian aggression against Ethiopia, and by German violation of Versailles and Locarno through the reoccupation of the Rhineland. But, as far as Canadians were concerned, Japan and Germany were far away. Canadians were more concerned with domestic issues and the state of the economy, and increasingly less concerned with world affairs. The economic impact of the depression was the major preoccupation of all Canadian governments during the 1930's; the security aspects of foreign policy was treated as a very subordinate matter.

Canada did not embark on a radically new foreign policy under R. B. Bennett, the new Conservative Prime Minister in 1930, but continued with the isolationist policy which had become entrenched since 1919. Except for questions of tariffs and trade Bennett was not interested in foreign policy. Like Mackenzie King, he was not inclined to promote parliamentary discussion of foreign affairs.¹ King readily seconded Bennett's refusal to discuss external affairs. In fact, King went so far as to criticize Secretary of State C. H. Cahan for making a statement in the House on the address Cahan had made at the special session of the League Assembly when the Lytton Commission Report came before it. The Leader of the Opposition did not want the subject debated.² Mackenzie

King had nothing to say about the Manchurian crisis. When the issue was raised in the House he did not enter into the debate, made no statements, asked no questions of the Prime Minister.³ Indirect endorsement of the government's approach to the crisis was given on February 8, 1932, though, when Mackenzie King declined to comment on it except to criticize the resort to force and emphasized the importance of League machinery and "international public opinion" as the means to settle the dispute.⁴

The Lytton Report condemned Japanese aggression and refused to recognize the separation of Manchuria from China. Japan, firmly in possession of Manchuria, gave its notice of withdrawal from League membership in March 1932.⁵ A severe blow had been dealt to the shaky structure of collective security. Other events indicated a complete breakdown of the international system. After coming to power in January 1933, Hitler withdrew Germany from both the League of Nations and the Disarmament Conference. The Disarmament Conference adjourned in 1934, its two years of discussion ending without any agreements having been reached.⁶

The unqualified success of the challenge of a major power against the collective security system seriously threatened the credibility of both the concept and the League of Nations. Mackenzie King was not willing to abandon the League, though, since such a step "implied an acceptance of the inevitability of a new war which hardly seemed justified by a single major failure."⁷ Late in 1934 the Liberal leader publicly endorsed a Canadian initiative in applying economic sanctions. Before the National Liberal Federation on December 12, 1934, King asserted that Liberals had to "become militant in our advocacy of those policies which may serve to strengthen the League in its work." A policy

of economic sanctions would bring an end to war propaganda and witness "the certain dawn of world peace," but it would require united action on the part of the great powers to be wholly effective. Some country had to take the lead, and that country was Canada. "This country should definitely declare not only that it will give no succor to any nation which wantonly disturbs the world's peace, but that it will provide neither arms nor foodstuffs nor credits to such a nation."⁸

King's support for economic sanctions through the League was probably influenced by domestic political considerations. First, it would seem that Mackenzie King was directing his comments to those Liberals, such as J. W. Dafoe of the Winnipeg Free Press, who clung to the League as the only hope for a peaceful world by posing as a man who was of the same mind and merited their support. Second, it was a challenge to the Bennett government. The Conservatives, after King's speech, would be damned if they did commit Canada in advance to a policy of economic sanctions, and damned if they did not.

On April Fool's Day, 1935 King made his position on external affairs even more ambiguous. In a speech to the House, Mackenzie King made some rambling remarks about collective security, economic appeasement, Canada's role in the League of Nations, the strength of Canada's voice in international affairs through the imperial connection, and the possible adverse effects abroad of discussion on external affairs by the Canadian Parliament.⁹ The Leader of the Opposition appeared to offer something to the "isolationists," the "imperialists," the "collectivists," and the silent majority of Canadians, possibly with an eye to the approaching general election. But nothing of substance was offered. King's attitude toward collective security had not changed. The League was not to be an effective instrument to maintain international

peace and security through prior commitments. Canadian sovereignty would not be infringed. Instead, the League would be a meeting place where all nations could gather and discuss incessantly their problems and in that way reach a compromise. A compromise would, of course, be subject to the decision of Parliament.

In the summer of 1935 Mackenzie King was apprehensive about the possibility of a European war arising out of Italy's menacing attitude toward Ethiopia. If the League imposed sanctions against Italy, Canada might be involved. He carefully avoided any comments regarding Canadian policy toward economic sanctions, and in general refrained from making the crisis an issue in the campaign. In his opening campaign statement at London, Ontario, on August 15 King raised the question of Ethiopia in the election for the first time by denying that Bennett had the right to commit Canada to any policy until there was a new Parliament and a new government in office. It would then be up to Parliament to decide.¹⁰

At St. John, New Brunswick, King criticized the inadequacy of the Canadian delegation to the League on the ground that none of its members had ever sat in Parliament or had any experience of government or of

international problems.¹¹ At Quebec City on September 7 Lapointe asserted "that in my opinion no interest in Ethiopia, of any nature whatever, is worth the life of a single Canadian citizen." He was "unalterably opposed" to Canadian participation in such a war. King declared that he did not believe Canadians would support a war involving

economic interests.¹² The party had no official policy on the Ethiopian situation. On the question of economic sanctions against Italy in the event of a crisis in Africa King and Lapointe were silent.

Voters went to the polls on Monday, October 14, and on the following morning the extent of Mackenzie King's tremendous victory

became known. Bennett instructed the Canadian delegation at Geneva to take no further position on any League matters until instructions were received from the new government.¹³ The most immediate result of the October election, as far as Canadian foreign policy decision-making was concerned, was to leave a vacuum at the political level at a critical moment.¹⁴ Bennett continued in office on a caretaker basis but took no policy initiatives until Mackenzie King had formed his cabinet and was ready to assume office.

Three days after the election, Thursday, October 17, the real business of cabinet-making began. On that day King had a conversation with Lapointe about Cabinet posts. He decided to keep the External Affairs portfolio for himself.

At the outset, I said to Lapointe I thought I had better take on External Affairs for a time at least, because of the war situation in Europe. I might have added, also, because of the important treaty negotiations, and the like. I could see that Lapointe was disappointed, as he had told me quite frankly, when he spoke to me some months ago, that he would like External Affairs. I realize, however, that English speaking Canada would not welcome his having control of External Affairs while war is on; also, he, himself, has not stood up for the League of Nations as I think he should have, having been President of the Ottawa Society, and having been its strongest advocate in Canada; also, that Dandurand, who was President of the Assembly, would appear to be ready to forsake their sic obligations to the League.

Interesting comments from the man in the highest political office in the Dominion who did not like the League of Nations, and would show that dislike in the near future.

The new government took office on October 23, but decisions continued to be made in Geneva. Howard Ferguson, the Canadian High Commissioner in London and delegate to Geneva, resigned immediately after Bennett's defeat leaving Walter Riddell, Canadian Advisory Officer at Geneva, as the head of the Geneva delegation.¹⁵ By October 19, four

days before the King government took office, the first phase of the Assembly's work on sanctions had been completed. The Co-ordination Committee and the Committee of Eighteen evolved five proposals on sanctions to be submitted to fifty governments which had declared Italy to be the aggressor: the prohibition of export of arms and munitions to Italy, the prohibition of granting loans and credits, the prohibition of all imports from Italy, the prohibition of exporting certain products to Italy, and a provision for mutual support among the sanction-applying states so that the burden would be as fairly distributed as possible.

The text was communicated to all member-states and replies stating what action they proposed to take were requested no later than October 28.¹⁷

The King government was thus confronted at the outset with a critical problem in external affairs on which an immediate decision was required. In response to the deteriorating situation in Ethiopia during May and June Skelton had instructed Riddell, Canada's representative on the Committee of Thirteen, on July 8 and 23 to support economic sanctions if the League should decide on their application.

In sub-committee you should state . . . that in any contingency where it is agreed that economic sanctions should be applied withholding key products and raw materials is one important method of applying them. List of such key products and raw materials to be effective should be comprehensive.¹⁸

By late August, though, the Under-Secretary favoured an abstentionist policy which he argued in an August 26 memorandum to Prime Minister Bennett. The instructions finally sent to Geneva in September reflected Skelton's position: nothing was to be said.¹⁹ Two months later Skelton drew up a memorandum on the problems facing the new government in external affairs and reiterated the position he had taken in August. He summarized the proposals for sanctions made to date by the League,

attacked the defects of the League, and emphasized the dangers of the situation.²⁰ The document argued the case against sanctions more fervently than it argued the case in favour.

The day after he wrote this memorandum Skelton saw Mackenzie King about external affairs. In fact, it was the first time the two men met after the election. Over lunch they discussed, at some length, the question of sanctions. The Committee of Eighteen had already recommended an embargo by all member-states on arms shipments and the shipment of selected raw materials to Italy, all imports from Italy, and all financial transactions with Italy. A decision on some of the proposals was due by October 28. Skelton warned the Prime Minister that to enforce economic sanctions could involve Canada in a war, while to reject them could undermine the efforts of the League to deter aggression. Later that afternoon the new cabinet met to discuss the major questions in foreign affairs which Skelton had outlined, and Mackenzie King had an opportunity to read the Under-Secretary's memorandum.

We had the first meeting of cabinet at 2:30 today. I had not time to read over the brief Skelton had prepared for me on the matter of sanctions until I got into Council. I took up this subject at once, and, in the course of discussion, read through the statement of the case as Skelton had prepared it.

The majority of the cabinet favoured the implementation of the proposed economic sanctions because "they felt the necessity of standing by League, in view of our platform, from which there was no escape" It was united in its opposition to military sanctions, but the cabinet was far from unanimous on the question of the scope of economic sanctions. The Prime Minister himself made a clear distinction between economic and military sanctions, and noted in his diary that he would go no farther than economic sanctions in view of the domestic situation,²¹ but he had

yet to decide on how far he was prepared to go in implementing economic sanctions.

Mackenzie King recognized that the Ethiopian crisis had provoked different responses from English- and French-Canadians, responses which favourably disposed to the League, there was no deep attachment to the concept of collective security. But if Britain intervened in Africa on the side of international justice then they would support League action. French-Canadians saw the debate at Geneva in terms of imperial rivalry, a case of Britain attempting to thwart Italian imperialistic ambitions in Africa.²² King recognized the difference and sensed danger.

The cabinet discussed the general question of economic sanctions on October 28. Underlying the discussion was the fear that "military sanctions" were the logical extension of "economic sanctions."²³ The possibility of a major crisis was underlined for King the following day during a discussion with Lapointe on the wording of the press statement on the imposition of economic sanctions and the despatch to be sent to Geneva. If the government decided in favour of military sanctions, Lapointe would resign "at once"; if the government decided against military sanctions, "and the question came to be one which we had to decide . . . Ilsley and one or two others would resign." In other words, if the government did not decide against military sanctions or if economic sanctions meant participation in military sanctions, the Liberal party would be divided again as it had been at the time of conscription. The Prime Minister decided in favour of the views of Lapointe and French-Canadian opinion. The statement went "a little more in the way of caution and reservation than the majority of the cabinet would have liked, but which Lapointe regarded as most impostant." Mackenzie King

had reluctantly agreed to have Canada participate in the proposed economic sanctions, but would in no way adopt a course of action that would threaten the domestic situation and Canadian unity.²⁴

Riddell was informed that the Canadian government would comply with the sanctions proposals,²⁵ but another telegram sent to Geneva on October 29 quoted the Prime Minister's statement to the press.²⁶ It did not include instructions for Riddell regarding what position he was to take in the session of the Committee of Eighteen which resumed sitting on October 29. Yet Riddell had sent repeated requests emphasizing the urgent need for instructions.²⁷

In his press statement on October 29 Mackenzie King announced that Canada would adopt the recommended measures. He also reviewed the history of Canadian opposition to sanctions. The proposals were accepted on the condition that they were applied with "an earnest effort" and with wide support. Acceptance in the present crisis did not create a precedent for the future, nor were economic sanctions to be taken as binding Canada to adopt military sanctions.²⁸ The statement gave the impression that it had been drafted in a mood of grudging acquiescence in that much of it was devoted to reviewing the grievances against collective security and sanctions.

Riddell interpreted the rather ambiguous statement as acceptance by the new government without any reservations of the sanctions proposals agreed upon by the Co-ordination Committee. This attitude put the Canadian Advisory Officer in conflict with External Affairs' opinion of the League and was adopted despite the reservations contained in the Prime Minister's statement.²⁹ It was not a case, though, of Riddell simply failing to grasp the significance of what his government was trying to say. Riddell was an experienced diplomat, and had been

involved in League affairs since 1920. He knew he had no right to make independent decisions. Moreover, Riddell was more than familiar with the views and attitudes of Mackenzie King and O. D. Skelton. His unauthorized proposal of oil sanctions at a meeting of the Committee of Eighteen on November 2, 1935, was nothing but a violation of the traditional role and responsibilities of a state's representative.

Ottawa was guilty of not sending Riddell the full text of the press statement, but he misinterpreted its purpose. What he received was intended for general information only, but was interpreted at Geneva as instructions.³⁰ In fact, instructions were not sent by the new Canadian government until November 2, eleven days after it had taken office.³¹ The new government abandoned the Advisory Officer while it formulated policy, but at the same time he was guilty of inadequately informing the Department of External Affairs of the actions of the Canadian delegation on matters such as the implications of Canadian membership on the Committee of Eighteen.³²

Mackenzie King first heard of Riddell's initiative at Geneva on November 2 when he read it in the newspapers.³³ A brief statement of his action was sent by Riddell to Ottawa.³⁴ King's response was immediate, but private. Government policy was to avoid all public reference to Riddell's action in the hope that it might disappear quickly. King checked with Skelton who told him that no instructions had been sent to Riddell authorizing any action of the kind taken. Instructions had been sent to Riddell within an hour after receiving his request for them. The Prime Minister, upon learning the facts from Skelton, drafted and despatched a strong reprimand:

I have noted with much surprise from your brief statement in telegram No. 189, November 2/ and more lengthy press despatches that without authorization

you took the initiative in moving certain additional articles be added to list in Proposal No. 4. You must of course realize that you are acting for the Government of Canada and not for any other government, delegation or committee. When you desire instructions on any proposal you should communicate sufficiently in advance to give time for consideration here. Every effort will be made to give prompt instructions but in any case you should not take action on any question of importance such as those recently considered without definite and positive instructions.³⁵

Riddell replied by relating the circumstances which had led him to act as he had done,³⁶ but the Cabinet was "incensed at what they had read of Canada's action, which they regarded as wholly unwarranted."³⁷ King acknowledged Riddell's explanation with an emphatic cable on November 7: "I have noted your explanation but must insist that position which you took was not in my judgement in conformity with important factors in Canadian situation and not within the scope of your authority."³⁸

The Prime Minister, reviewing the Riddell affair in the House on February 11, 1936, told the members that when the government became aware of the Advisory Officer's proposal careful consideration was given to an immediate public repudiation of the act. He declared:

. . . it was only because we were most anxious not to take any step which might possibly embarrass the situation in Europe or which might appear to even remotely indicate an exception on the part of Canada to what was being done by other parts of the British empire, that we refrained from taking any action of that kind.³⁹

It may seem that Mackenzie King spoke to the House with tongue in cheek on the issue of publicity, but in November 1935 he hoped that Riddell's initiative would be quickly forgotten in the onrush of other events, especially if Ottawa remained silent. Such was not the case, though. The international press considered Riddell's proposal as "the Canadian proposal." The press repeatedly credited Canada and the King government with the authorship of the proposal and with being in the vanguard in support of sanctions.⁴⁰ Almost four weeks after Riddell made his proposal

Vincent Massey, the new Canadian High Commissioner in London, sent a despatch to Mackenzie King discussing British press opinion.

They are so commonly referred to in the press as the 'Canadian proposals' that this designation is on the way to being, if it has not already actually been, accepted as their appropriate description

Additional references could be quoted to indicate that whatever may be the exact nature and status of the action taken at Geneva in this matter, the parentage of that action is, in this country, ascribed to Canada.⁴¹

The Canadian government was unhappy about this state of affairs but for the moment it silently supported Riddell. After getting the new administration under way, Mackenzie King and Skelton spent most of November in the United States visiting Washington and vacationing at Sea Island, Georgia. In Ottawa, Lapointe was left as the Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs and Laurent Beaudry as the Acting Under-Secretary. During his visit to Washington, King did discuss the situation in Geneva with President Roosevelt. Telling the Canadian Prime Minister that the United States "would seek to do all it could to assist the League," Roosevelt asked him "if Riddell were not a Liberal." King's reply showed that he was still strongly irritated. "I told him he was pretty much anything, I thought, and had acted off his own bat in regard to the suggestion re further prohibitions, much to the annoyance of myself and colleagues."⁴²

The two vacationers did not escape the press references. Italy regarded the Canadian proposal as a serious threat to its African expedition, warning of the consequences "not only to Italy, but to the whole world."⁴³ On November 23 Skelton instructed Beaudry to inform Riddell "not to take any initiative in making or advocating the proposal though he may vote for proposal if it meets with approval other members generally." King at first considered refusing permission to vote but

changed his decision "because of reported imminence of the discussion at Geneva."⁴⁴ Three days later Skelton told Beaudry to modify any instructions he may have sent to Riddell, so as to make it clear to the Advisory Officer that he was not "to act at his own discretion or pull any more of Mr. Anthony Eden's chestnuts out of the fire."⁴⁵

Lapointe was disturbed by headlines in the press continually referring to "the Canadian proposal." Beaudry informed Skelton that the Acting Secretary was "wondering whether some course of action could be adopted to counteract this effect."⁴⁶ Skelton conferred with Mackenzie King who was alarmed at the treatment of the proposal in the press.

I took very strongly, with Skelton, the view that we should not delay in making it known, through an interview with the press by Lapointe, that the resolution was not one of which our Government had any knowledge, nor with respect to which Riddell had authority from the Government; that it was a Committee resolution brought forward by Riddell himself I take the position that our Government has been returned by the Canadian people, and that our duty, first and foremost, is to them, and where it is our duty to take the steps which will prevent Canada from being drawn into war.⁴⁷

Skelton sent a telegram to Beaudry along those lines after speaking with King. Lapointe was to be interviewed by the press; Massey was to be informed of Riddell's initiative on November 2 and instructed to inform the British government that Riddell had acted on his own and his proposal did not have the support of the Canadian government.⁴⁸ Beaudry, upon receiving Skelton's telegram, cabled back asking if King would consider sending Dandurand to Geneva for the "next meeting of League Committee with special instructions to survey situation and prevent further commitment."⁴⁹ The Prime Minister was opposed to the suggestion. It was not necessary, and Mackenzie King was eager to have the French Canadian members of his government appear in the situation "as little as possible."⁵⁰

The statement was drafted by Lapointe and Beaudry and released to the press in time for publication on December 2. Massey had already been sent his instructions⁵¹ and Riddell was sent a resumé of the press statement on December 1 with the order that he was not to comment upon it to anyone in Geneva.⁵² Compared to Beaudry's memorandum of November 29, which foresaw extreme consequences arising from the proposal for an oil embargo,⁵³ Lapointe's press statement was a very quiet document. The Acting Prime Minister denied that Canada had taken the initiative in extending the embargo upon exportation of key materials to Italy and declared that the opinion expressed by Riddell a month earlier was his own personal opinion and did not represent the views of the Canadian government.⁵⁴

The repudiation announcement occasioned another series of Press comments, both in Canada and overseas, on Canadian policy. External Affairs and the League of Nations Society prepared their own summaries of press comment, reporting a marked cleavage of opinion over Lapointe's statement. The French-Canadian press supported the government's action, while the English-Canadian press ranged from qualified approval to emphatic demand for a complete statement of the government's position on the entire matter of economic sanctions.⁵⁵ Despatches from Italy and France, on December 2 and 4 respectively, showed that Lapointe's statement had not gone unnoticed in Europe. A spokesman for Pierre Laval, the French Foreign Minister, supported Canada's repudiation of the oil sanctions proposal, saying it "was of the highest international significance at a moment when the peace of Europe hangs by a thin thread."⁵⁶ On December 5, Massey reported on the immediate press reaction in Britain:

In Rothermere and Beaverbrook papers opposing sanctions
Canadian statement given great prominence and extravagant
inferences drawn claiming changes in Canada's policy towards

sanctions Also reports are published in these and other papers from Geneva and Rome alleging that Canadian statement has caused amazement in the former centre and great satisfaction in the latter.⁵⁷

Mackenzie King and Skelton returned to Ottawa shortly after December 2. Disturbed by the attention given to his colleague's statement, King met the press himself on December 6. The Prime Minister said that his government's statement made reference only to the origin of the proposal, not to its merits.⁵⁸ He was silent on the subject of what the Canadian government did think of the merits of the oil sanction. Some eight governments informed the League that they accepted the proposed oil embargo. Concerned with the Italian propaganda, the Secretary of the Co-ordinating Committee asked if a statement might be made by Ottawa.⁵⁹ Mackenzie King did not think it necessary to issue any further statements since his statement to the press on December 6 was sufficient.⁶⁰

The oil sanction caught the imagination of the world when proposed by Riddell on November 2. Deprived of their oil supply the Italians would have had to retreat, or at least halt their invasion of Ethiopia. In April 1936 it was shown that a League embargo on oil would have succeeded because American oil exports to Italy accounted for only a small percentage of that country's total oil imports despite its rise in the 1934-1935 totals.⁶¹ The Riddeil affair was a highly embarrassing, but not critical, situation for Mackenzie King. He firmly believed that, through no fault of his own, his government had been unnecessarily exposed to sharp criticism at home and abroad. The revelation of the Hoare-Laval plan meant that the focus of world attention now shifted. Canadian policy was no longer the subject of major interest, but that of Britain and France was. Officially released to the public on December 13, the Hoare-Laval plan effectively halted the extension of sanctions to

oil or any other item.⁶² Canada was able to retire into the comfortable obscurity so much desired by Mackenzie King.

It all shows, I think, the absurdity of Canada trying to deal in European or other world situations upon which she will have no voice. I agree with Lapointe that the League of Nations, as an agency for world peace, cannot contemplate action which necessarily means war; also, that territorial concessions to warring nations are not a part of the business of the League. It is clear to me that an effort to control the welfare of individual nations by collective action of nations is going to be a next to impossible thing. It is better that their security be effected by relations between individual states.⁶³

The first session of the new Parliament did not meet until February 1936. This was the first opportunity that the members had to discuss or question government policy and action during the Ethiopian crisis. The war was still in progress and there was hope in some quarters that the oil embargo would be imposed.⁶⁴ On February 10 and 11 the role of the Canadian government in the crisis was discussed in the House; the debate was confined to the Riddell affair. Bennett, now Leader of the Opposition, strongly criticized the government for taking action contrary to the rules of the League and for repudiating the commitment Canada made when it joined the League.⁶⁵ Mackenzie King replied with a detailed account of the incident. He defended Lapointe's statement of December 2, claiming full responsibility for what Lapointe had done and said because he had acted on King's instructions. The Prime Minister also reiterated arguments used at his own press conference on December 6. He even went so far as to take some credit for having stopped a dangerous move. King was appalled that the Dominion should "attempt to regulate a European war and to say what other countries are to do with respect to the manner in which a European war is to be carried on." Pressing for oil sanctions at that moment would have been dangerous. If it had not been for the government of Mackenzie King "the whole of

Europe might have been a-flame to-day."⁶⁶ But King would not be drawn into a discussion of the merits of the oil sanctions proposal.

Despite the efforts of T. C. Douglas and J. S. Woodsworth of the C.C.F. and Agnes MacPhail of the U.F.O. to force a debate on collective security, on the general question of sanctions, and on the League of Nations, the government refused to make any comment. Silence would best serve the public interest. When German soldiers marched into the Rhineland on March 7, "a policy of watchful waiting was adopted by Canada with respect to the European situation."⁶⁷ King advised one Liberal member of Parliament to refrain from discussing the European situation with his constituents.⁶⁸ On March 23 the Prime Minister told the House:

In the circumstances I think it would be in every way preferable, having regard to the extremely critical nature of the negotiations and the fact that the situation keeps changing not only from day to day but sometimes from hour to hour, for hon. members of this house to forbear, if they can see their way to do so, from preferring any request which might provoke discussion in our country at this time.

The attitude of the government was to do nothing.⁶⁹ The High Commissioner in London cabled Ottawa to urge the government to let him have its views on the Rhineland crisis. Mackenzie King was strongly opposed to Massey's suggestion, replying that communication between London and Ottawa should be between Ministers, not through the High Commissioner.⁷⁰

The government, though, was closely watching events in Europe and Ethiopia. A memorandum prepared in External Affairs examined the question of sanctions in advance of the March 2 Meeting of the Committee of Eighteen. Three possibilities, to press for it, to drop it, to follow the other Members, were presented. The memorandum dismissed the first possibility without comment. Canadian initiative in abandoning sanctions was seriously considered but rejected because of possible

political repercussions if Canada was associated with the failure of sanctions. The memorandum advised that the third option be followed, namely that Canada should do what the Committee of Eighteen might decide.⁷¹

It became increasingly difficult for Mackenzie King to maintain the silence that covered the government's attitude. King was urged to "speak now and speak clearly."⁷² The Prime Minister waited for the right time before he said anything. In the House he refused to make any statement on his government's attitude toward the continuance of sanctions against Italy.⁷³ On June 10 Neville Chamberlain declared publicly that the maintenance of sanctions against Italy was "midsummer madness." This speech was the signal for which King had been waiting.

Chamberlain's speech . . . makes perfectly clear that I was right when I said that my action and Lapointe's in exposing Riddell's action, and thereby restraining the application of sanctions against Italy at the time we did, saved a European war, for which Canada would have been blamed. . . . Another thing Chamberlain's speech has done has been to justify a thousand fold my action in not permitting a debate on Geneva to take place in our House of Commons up to the present time. Had we declared for the continuance of sanctions or against the continuance of sanctions, Britain would have jumped at using our attitude as an excuse for her own.⁷⁴

On June 18, 1936, Mackenzie King delivered his first detailed statement on external affairs, a speech which was one of the most carefully considered in his entire career. He began by defending the government's refusal to make a statement of policy during the Ethiopian crisis by saying "it will be generally conceded that the course of events in Europe has more than justified the government's attitude." The lack of discussion of Canada's external relations both in and outside Parliament was attributed by the Prime Minister to "our slow emergence from the colonial attitude of mind; our relative immunity from any serious danger of war on our own account," the problems of developing

the nation, and maintaining its unity. There was also the unparalleled complexity of the Dominion's position as a North American nation, a member of the League of Nations and the British Commonwealth.

The House was then told that the government had put into effect all economic sanctions recommended by the Co-ordination Committee at or before November 18. All were still in effect, strictly and effectively enforced. The Prime Minister, though, was against the application of economic sanctions.

There is no blinking the fact that economic sanctions may lead to war. They mean the application of force. They are not mere commercial measures. They are in intention and reality a means of imposing the will of one nation or group upon another nation or group. In modern times they have always, in different forms, been an important part of the technique of war.

The problem with sanctions was the inability of the powers that impose them to control them. The unknown factor in calculating the advantage of sanctions was the reaction of those states against whom they were directed. Mackenzie King questioned the effectiveness of an oil sanction, whether it would have stopped the Italians and whether enforcement of the oil sanction would have led to war. He blamed the European press for asserting "that Canada was initiating and urging the imposition of an oil sanction." The Dominion, Mackenzie King pointed out, had no special interest in the conflict to justify such an initiative, nor had the Canadian government opposed the oil sanction on principle. Canada's participation in economic sanctions did not commit it to participate in military sanctions.

King then went on to discuss the reasons for the failure of the League of Nations. Military sanctions were not utilized because Britain and France agreed between themselves to avoid them. The Council of the League never took a lead in the actions of the international

organization. The League failed because of Great Power rivalry and the insistence upon the use of arms to settle disputes; because military sanctions and full economic sanctions were not applied. "In brief, collective bluffing cannot bring collective security, and under present conditions most countries have shown they are not prepared to make firm commitments beyond the range of their immediate interests." The Canadian government's position on sanctions? Mackenzie King believed they should be lifted, and the Canadian delegation at the next meeting of the Assembly would be instructed accordingly.

Was there any future for the League? The League was essential as "an international clearing house, an agency for collective discussion and collective settlement of the problems the nations have in common." It was not to be an international organization able to use force against an aggressor to maintain peace. Problems were to be solved through conciliation, mediation, investigation, and arbitration. Mackenzie King then proceeded to examine the weaknesses of the League of Nations.

There is undoubtedly much that is attractive and persuasive in the conception of a world united to prevent by force a breach of the peace by any aggressor. It has been stoutly contended that if all nations would undertake to make war upon an aggressor, and carried out that undertaking, war would never occur. That may well be, but unfortunately it is only a hypothetical argument; it bears no relation to the actualities of today. It may be that eventually some rule of law will be established in the international as has been established in the national field, or at least in those countries where law and the free expression of the people's will still prevail. But clearly that time has not yet come, and to pretend that it has is only to make for disillusionment and misdirected effort.

The League lacked an overwhelming preponderance of power, economic and military, against any possible aggressor or combination of aggressors. Economic pressure must be backed by armed force. The League was not universal in its membership as anticipated in 1919. There must be the

certainty, King said, that the members will be ready to exercise force when the occasion arises, regardless of where and if they have a direct interest in the quarrel. This condition did not exist. Primarily and almost purely concerned with European problems, the automatic commitments of the Covenant of the League were almost useless due to the present stage of national development and would not be observed by Members of the League. "But that does not mean that there is not a great part for the league to play. If it cannot become the international war office, neither it become a mere debating society. It can emphasize the constructive side of its task."⁷⁵

A lucid justification of Canadian policy at Geneva and a severe indictment of the League of Nations, Mackenzie King's speech was surprisingly well received by the House, by the press, and by the Canadian public. The debate following the Prime Minister's speech lasted over three hours. Bennett made a pro-League statement similar in sentiment and attitude to what Mackenzie King had said; he found the League still a useful place for discussion and negotiation.⁷⁶ Woodsworth said he was generally in agreement with King, but would go as far as having Canada firmly declare its neutrality in any overseas conflict.⁷⁷ J. W. Dafoe was foremost among the few critics. His June 30 editorial was blunt:

Ever since the Manchurian episode the League has been dying from a mortal wound. Direct consequences of this demonstration that collective security, the foundation-stone of the League, was a sham were the failure of the disarmament conference; the Nazi defiance of the League, and the determination of Italy to attack Ethiopia Notwithstanding Mr. King's comfortable words the other day time will show that, taking the long view, Canada had a much greater interest in collective security than the Government of this country had any idea of when it fell in with the grand idea that the time had come to put the League out of business.⁷⁸

In a barrage of editorials in June and July Dafoe argued that collective security was the "foundation-stone" of the League and that the Prime Minister and Canada, by rejecting this, had repudiated the League.⁷⁹ Dafoe would make the same charge after King's speech to the League Assembly in September. But even he conceded, in private though, that the League was already doomed and that the Prime Minister could not have saved it. Thus Dafoe was advocating an impracticable defence of a dying League. Mackenzie King was not an editorial writer but a political leader, so he preferred to describe the League as it was, not as it should be, "in the hope that most Canadians would then forego the temptation to tilt at windmills."⁸⁰

Government policy was set and nothing could change it. A telegram was sent to Geneva containing the instructions for the delegation to the Assembly meeting of June and July. The Canadian delegation was to support any proposal for the removal of sanctions.⁸¹ On July 15 the measures taken under Article XVI were ended. The following day the Secretary General was advised that the Orders-in-Council passed by the Canadian government to implement all economic sanctions had been cancelled "as and from 15th July 1936."⁸²

Mackenzie King decided in June to attend the September session of the Assembly.⁸³ In deciding to go to Geneva it was not King's intention to put forward any Canadian proposal concerning the "reform" of the Covenant. What he did want to do was make his presence in Geneva felt by firmly stating to the Assembly Canada's conception of how the League should go about its business. He was also anxious to learn what he could about the European crisis from direct contact with European statesmen. Writing to the Duke of Montrose in August, King saw the European situation not as a struggle between nations but as a struggle

between the powers of light and the powers of darkness.

It seems to me that there is no more misleading term than that of "collective security." At bottom, the struggle seems to be not so much between nations as between conflicting ideas and ideals. The materialist world with its belief in force is seeking to conquer the world's spirit with its belief in invisible realities. It is an appalling struggle, one which, sooner or later, will engulf mankind.⁸⁴

The two contending forces thesis was made the theme of King's address at the League of Nations Society dinner at the Chateau Laurier on November 9⁸⁵ and the theme of a broadcast address on Armistice Day.⁸⁶

The Canadian delegation, composed of Mackenzie King, Senator Dandurand, Norman Rogers, Paul Martin, and O. D. Skelton, was in Geneva by September 19. Not addressing the Assembly until September 29, the Prime Minister spent his time before then on writing his speech, listening to the speeches of other delegates, and holding lengthy discussions on international affairs with various statesmen. But he was not impressed.

One felt the absurdity of entrusting the affairs of one's country directly or indirectly to an aggregation of the kind which one sees in the Assembly Hall. Countries named by the dozens of which one has seldom or never heard, and none of which have any real power or would be of the slightest use in the crisis. I do not wonder that nations like Japan, Germany and the United States which are really great powerful countries should prefer to stay out of the League altogether and manage their own affairs, rather than have a lot of countries intermingling in them.⁸⁷

The speech delivered by Mackenzie King to the Assembly was a statement of general principles rather than of detailed proposals, taking the form of suggestions rather than of a definite declaration of policy. To this extent King's address reflected certain conclusions reached by the British government and communicated to Ottawa before King departed for Geneva.⁸⁸ The address began by contrasting the

outlooks and interests of European and North American states. To "expect a North American State to have the same international outlook, the same conception of interest, or of duty, as a European State facing widely different conditions" would be unreasonable. The Dominion was not only a North American state, though; its experience as a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations influenced Canadian opinion on many League policies, especially the "questions of automatic obligations to the use of force in international disputes." The Canadian perspective was also influenced by its experience as a member of the League itself, and that experience had given rise to the conviction that "emphasis should be placed upon conciliation rather than upon coercion." Mackenzie King reaffirmed Canada's adherence to the ideals and fundamental principles of the League, which were the "preservation of peace by the progressive organization of international co-operation with a collective system" But automatic commitments to the use of force were not seen as a practical policy.

The Prime Minister then outlined Canadian policy toward the League in view of the experience of the Ethiopian crisis. The policies of the League had to conform to realities, contemporary attitudes and conditions, "without losing sight of the possibility of modifying those policies as facts and national attitudes change in the future." The first objective to make the League succeed was to obtain "the universal acceptance of the principles of the Covenant" because vacant seats in the Assembly served to only weaken "the chain of collective security." Mackenzie King told the Assembly he believed that the coercive and punitive provisions of the Covenant had retarded the universality of the League; by stressing the mediation and conciliation aspects of the Covenant "we can help to transform the collective system from a hope

into a reality." Formal amendment of the Covenant was neither possible nor necessary since the actions of Members speak louder than the text of the Covenant.

The facts were, said King, that many of the provisions of the Covenant had either not been observed or applied incompletely. Armaments had not been reduced, though Members were so pledged by Article VIII; Article XVI, the undertakings to apply sanctions were, in the early years of the League, recognized as unworkable; the pledge to revise treaties, contained in Article XIX, was a dead letter. Sanctions were not applied when conflict arose over Manchuria in Asia or during the Chaco War in South America; they failed in the Italo-Ethiopian crisis because "of general unwillingness under the conditions of the day to press force to its conclusion."

Mackenzie King drew a number of conclusions from the record of the League of Nations. The still-born concept of collective security might be replaced by regional security arrangements which would at least "show a closer approach to reality by linking the obligation with a definite contingency and a direct interest." The Canadian government was "in full sympathy" with shifting the emphasis to enquiry and mediation at an early stage in disputes, and agreed that unanimity could not "reasonably be required" in any effort by the Assembly or the Council to effect conciliation. But it would not agree to any proposal which would transform Article XI, which simply declared the indivisibility of peace, into a second sanctions article "applicable before war had broken out, and brought into operation by action of the Council alone." Mackenzie King's final proposal was that a conference be held involving states both in and out of the League to consider "anew how best the original purpose of universality of membership" could be achieved.⁸⁹

The Prime Minister was pleased with his speech to the Assembly. He doubted whether "a more unqualified statement of Canada's position . . . /had/ been made at any time, in any place, than that made here at Geneva on Tuesday of this week."⁹⁰ In a letter to Lord Tweedsmuir, the Governor-General, King discussed the similarity of views of the British and Canadian delegations on the question of sanctions. King had to say what he did. "I believe people are coming to see that the real weakness of the League lies in accepting professions at their face value and not sufficiently seeking to discover actualities and realities."⁹¹ Actuality and reality meant that collective security had failed. King had not ignored the problems of reconciling the principle of collective security with national self-interest. His argument in Canada and at Geneva had been that the major Powers had not accepted the actuality of collective security, which had been obvious from the beginning. But so long as states, large and small, acted to protect their own interests, they contributed to the ineffectiveness of any attempt to implement the principle.

March 1937 found Mackenzie King on his way to Washington for a meeting with President Roosevelt to discuss matters of mutual concern, the European situation in particular. Prior to his meeting with Roosevelt, King had a long conversation with Secretary of State Cordell Hull on March 5. Hull did most of the talking which delighted King since it did not draw him into any commitments or "into any expression of opinion." Hull expressed the opinion that the United States might be brought into the League if its name was changed, "and the way prepared meanwhile." King told him that he thought the important thing was to find a way of getting the major Powers together; the League organization, with some modification, might serve that end.

The Prime Minister went directly to the White House after his interview with Cordell Hull. Twice during the evening Mackenzie King brought up the question of possible United States participation in the League in the event of the Covenant being altered so as to eliminate sanctions. King first raised the question at dinner:

I asked the President a direct question as to whether he thought there was any possibility of the United States coming into the League to help in investigation of matters of justice to different nations, if the League itself changed the application of certain principles of the Covenant. If, for example, Section 16 was eliminated.

Roosevelt replied that he could send a representative to Geneva to take part in matters related to social and economic questions as long as the United States was not bound by an advance commitment. The sanctions obligations had to be out of the way. For King, the important part of their discussion came when he proposed to Roosevelt that the United States take the lead in those social and economic questions which he believed were at the root of the present world conflict.⁹² The Prime Minister left a copy of a summary of his conversation with the President, which the President promised he would carefully consider. Collective security, as defined in the summary, was not to be identified with a reliance upon force, but "lies in the sense of Social Justice being secured through investigation and exposure of social wrongs, and the power of an organized public opinion founded upon same."⁹³

Pleased by his talks with the President, Mackenzie King wrote to the Governor-General that he believed "that there is every probability of the President himself taking action of a kind which will make clear his desire to effect an appeasement of conditions in Europe by lending good offices toward that end."⁹⁴ King was confident that his friend in the White House could save the world "from internal and international

strife."⁹⁵

During his stay in Washington Mackenzie King had hoped to involve the United States in a plan for universal economic appeasement through a world conference to be held in Geneva. King's desperate hope for peace did not blind him to the possibility of war. Conditions were steadily deteriorating, and all the Americans had to offer were the preachings of economic appeasement and words of good will.⁹⁶ That was not enough. The notion of economic appeasement died at the Imperial Conference of 1937; military and foreign questions, not economics, played important parts in the agenda of the Conference.

Mackenzie King delivered a statement on foreign affairs at a secret session of the Principal Delegates to the Conference on the afternoon of May 21. Commenting on British policy only insofar as he saw it responsible for some lessening of tension in Europe, King's statement dealt with questions of foreign policy as they affected Canada only. There followed the customary comprehensive survey of the Dominion's relations with various countries, especially the United States, and remarks on the domestic situation in Canada. The Delegates were told these could be overcome only if the task of maintaining national unity was not complicated by the threats of overseas wars.

On the League of Nations and the issue of sanctions Mackenzie King restated the position he had taken at Geneva the previous autumn. Automatic commitment to the application of force was not a practical policy. Canadian opinion was now overwhelmingly hostile to the idea of the League as a coercive instrument.

The lack of universality, the failure of members of the League even to attempt to enforce the coercion provisions when the conflict was far from Europe's shores, the failure to carry out the pledges of disarmament, or to attempt to

apply article 19, make it impossible to regard article 10 or article 16 as having any real validity.

This situation, according to the Canadian Prime Minister, "should be frankly recognized."⁹⁷

The foreign policies of the Dominions or Great Britain were not changed at London, but all were agreed on political appeasement as the tool to use if war was to be averted.⁹⁸ Mackenzie King left the Conference for Berlin where he met with various Nazi leaders and had an audience with Hitler. Mesmerized by his host, impressed by both Göring and von Neurath, Mackenzie King was more reassured about the European situation than he had been before leaving Canada. He saw Hitler as an intense nationalist, resentful of wrongs against Germany,⁹⁹ and was confident the Germans were not contemplating war in the west.¹⁰⁰ Unfortunately, King's misperception of the Nazi leaders was to prove tragic.

Between May 1937 and September 1939 there were two discernible threads in Mackenzie King's foreign policy. The first was an almost unshakeable faith in the policy of Neville Chamberlain. King was "delighted" with the way Chamberlain dealt with many of the problems which confronted him after attaining office.¹⁰¹ Canada was silent as Britain acquiesced to the German annexation of Austria in March 1938. Mackenzie King made every attempt to refrain from making any public statement; speeches in Parliament were avoided. But the announcement of the settlement at Munich in September 1938 forced King to say something. The Canadian Prime Minister publicly rejoiced with the announcement of the agreement.¹⁰² The settlement seemed to conform to his ideas of conciliation and negotiation between national leaders, and because it appeared to promise peace. Six months later, though, the Munich

settlement lay in ruins as German troops seized a rump Czechoslovakia and Europe prepared for war.

The second thread of King's policy was to eliminate action through the League as a viable policy alternative for his government, to refuse to co-operate in imperial defence, and to turn towards the United States for security. In other words, Mackenzie King rejected collective security abroad and attempted to substitute regional security. Privately, King expressed an ever-growing abhorrence for the League. To Lord Tweedsmuir, a staunch supporter of Chamberlain's appeasement policy, Mackenzie King freely expressed himself.

I wish the League of Nations could be gotten out of the way altogether. Every feeling I have had about the mischief being wrought through the intrigues of that institution has been intensified by what I have seen and heard while abroad. To have, in the heart of Europe, an institution which pretends to enforce peace through its reliance upon force, is, in itself, a source of potential danger.

The proper role for the League was one of investigation, mediation, and the formation of public opinion.¹⁰³ The League was responsible for most of the present situation, a second government trying to control member governments.¹⁰⁴ King's perception of the nature and power of the League of Nations at this critical time did not blind him to the ambitions and weaknesses of its member-states. His hostility to the League, and his distrust of Canadian initiatives, was reflected by Canada's representatives at Geneva becoming silent and frustrated spectators. Vincent Massey's experience as Delegate to the Eighteenth Assembly was discouraging.

I am increasingly conscious of the futility of my existence in Geneva. . . . In fact I cannot help feeling that I might more appropriately hold a visitor's ticket . . . than a delegate's

The real difficulty is the state of funk in which the Govt. or rather the P.M. lives vis a vis international affairs¹⁰⁵

Successive Canadian delegations at Geneva had very little to do.¹⁰⁶

On May 24, 1938, Mackenzie King attacked the League in a lengthy speech in the House of Commons. His sole purpose was to discredit the League before the House as a policy option come the threat or outbreak of war. The old arguments of geographical remoteness, the failure of Articles X and XVI, the lack of universal membership, and the impracticality of automatic commitments were forcefully repeated. The League of Nations had no strength, it could only discuss. Moreover, the Prime Minister disavowed any responsibility for what had happened in Geneva and to the League over the years.

It has been alleged by some strong advocates of the collective coercion theory in Canada that Canada is responsible for wrecking this conception of the league. That view is part and parcel of the exaggerated idea of Canada's power and duty and the unwillingness to face the realities as to the attitudes of other states that underlies the advocacy of the 100 per cent sanctions doctrine.

International obligations were to be abrogated by national interests. Each member of the League had its own interests, its own views of the League's interests, and its own approach to the problems of the League. The Prime Minister understood that, given Canada's limited power, it could have done very little to influence the major powers.¹⁰⁷

At the 1937 Imperial Conference the Canadian delegation refused to become involved in imperial defence questions. Parliament would decide on Canadian participation in British wars in view of the existing domestic and political circumstances with an eye to preserving Canadian unity.¹⁰⁸ But if Britain was Canada's first line of defence, then the question of preparations for possible involvement could not be postponed until the outbreak of war. In 1938 Mackenzie King had to face the problem with the Bren gun contract, which involved co-operation

in defence production, and air training, which involved military co-operation. The Canadian government eventually agreed to have a private Canadian firm manufacture Bren guns for the armies of both countries, but each government signed separate contracts with the manufacturer. Therefore, Ottawa could avoid the appearance of Anglo-Canadian co-operation in defence production.¹⁰⁹ British proposals for the training of pilots in Canada involved the political problem of just how far the Dominion could co-operate without raising the spectre of commitment to wartime co-operation in some sectors of Canada. Mackenzie King in May 1938 told Sir Francis Floud, the British High Commissioner, and J. G. Weir, head of the British air mission touring North America, that the proposals were politically unacceptable. Not until April of the following year did the two governments reach an agreement whereby "the R.C.A.F. would integrate with its own training plans some 50 British pilots who on completion of their training would enter the R.A.F. The programme was to run for three years."¹¹⁰ Britain and Canada were at war with Germany before the first draft of British personnel arrived in Canada.

The rejection of the League and a strong imperial defence policy as mainstays of Canadian security appeared to be substituted by a move towards some sort of regional security arrangement with the United States. The subject of continental defence was discussed very tentatively in 1938 by Canadian and American chiefs of staff. Mackenzie King agreed to these meetings and was kept informed of the outcome of the staff conversations held in the course of the year.¹¹¹ Roosevelt gave the idea of continental defence a measure of publicity in his speech at Kingston in August 1938: "The Dominion of Canada is part of the sisterhood of the British Empire. I give to you assurance that the people of the United States will not stand idly by if domination of

Canadian soil is threatened by any other empire."¹¹² External Affairs saw the speech as a reflection of the national self-interest of the United States, with the implied threat that the United States would defend Canada if the Dominion was unable to do the job.¹¹³ Mackenzie King sought to alleviate these apprehensions two days after Roosevelt's speech by asserting clearly and specifically that Canada was responsible for its own defence, but would make Canada as "immune from attack or possible invasion" to prevent enemy forces from attacking the United States across Canadian territory. The problems of continental defence were discussed by the two leaders in November 1938 during one of Mackenzie King's trips to Washington.¹¹⁴ However, King was not willing to bind Canada to any formal agreement of regional security.

The fact that the Prime Minister had turned his back on the League and that he was following the course charted by Neville Chamberlain did not prevent some individuals in External Affairs from expressing their opinions and ideas on these subjects to the Under-Secretary. In December 1938, as the situation in Europe remained highly unstable in spite of the Munich agreement of two months earlier, Hume Wrong sent a memorandum from Geneva embodying some of his opinions on the position of Canada in the light of events preceding Munich and subsequent international developments.

The first thing Wrong recognized was that any government in Ottawa, in the present state of Canadian opinion, could not keep the Dominion out of a major war if Britain was involved. Nor would the British government enter a war on the European continent "except on a paramount issue." Regardless of whether or not a war would have been fought as a League war under the Covenant, if war had come over Czechoslovakia it would have, in Wrong's estimation, made little

difference to Canadian opinion. "Canada was involved as a member of the British Commonwealth and not as a Member of the League of Nations."

Wrong was bothered by a critical weakness in his country's self-government: "so long as the most vital decision which can arise in the life of a nation is not taken in fact as well as in form by the leaders of the Canadian people" then Canadian autonomy was unfulfilled. Since 1919 the most consistent trend in the foreign policy of successive Canadian governments had been the limitation of political commitments. The Dominion had opposed the sanctions articles in the Covenant; it did not want to be involved in hostilities as a consequence of any decision taken by the Council of the League of Nations under Article XVI. But "no sanctions will be applied under the Covenant except with the full support of Great Britain. No war will be fought as a League war in which Great Britain is not a participant. The participation of Great Britain will almost certainly mean the participation of Canada."

"What then should be done," Wrong asked, "to escape from the dilemma that a policy of avoiding formal commitments has in fact left Canada still deeply committed to the United Kingdom?" The answer, for the Permanent Delegate of Canada to the Assembly of the League, was the development and expression of a positive Canadian external policy. The dangers of League membership, and with them the influence of the international organization, had disappeared. But there was still the possibility, Wrong felt, that the Covenant would be invoked against those States regarded as aggressors if war came within the next few years. The Permanent Delegate advised that, even though the League could scarcely be used as an important element in foreign policy, in the light of recent events Canadian interests would be best served by accepting the interpretation that sanctions were optional, rather than

by asserting that sanctions had in practice been removed from the Covenant. The existence of sanctions could be used as a "casus foederis", a situation covered by the provisions of the Covenant of the League, rather than the membership in the Commonwealth if Canada was to go to war in the future.

Although one must admit, in the present state of both Canadian opinion and of the League, the presence of a good deal of unreality in this conception, it seems wise to preserve the possibility of the application of sanctions under the Covenant, if only to provide a legal means whereby Canada can enter under her own steam, as it were, a war in which she would in any case be involved as a member of the Commonwealth.

Canadian self-government would be complete.¹¹⁵

Skelton understood the ideas and arguments employed by Wrong. He did not think that by taking decisions "on war participation through the agency of the League and as a Member of the League" Canada would increase the semblance of independent action or its self respect. Wrong's proposal did not offer a solution. The Under-Secretary's reply was straightforward:

Such action would not fool any other country nor even ourselves. The plain fact is that if we go into any European war it will be simply and solely on the grounds of racial sympathy with the United Kingdom. Why obscure this fact or try to dress it up with talk about saving democracy or our League obligations? The sooner we face the actual reality the better.¹¹⁶

When war broke out in September 1939, Parliament was called. The Prime Minister reviewed the causes leading to the outbreak of war in Europe, informing Parliament that it was the policy of the government to commit the Dominion to Britain's side in the new war. At no time did Mackenzie King make any reference to Canada's obligations and responsibilities as a Member of the League of Nations. Canada went to war not through its membership in the League, but through its membership

in the British Commonwealth.¹¹⁷ The Dominion would, though, maintain its membership in the League of Nations and give it financial support during the next six years.

Chapter IV
THE YEARS OF WAR

The decision to go to war had been made, the money allocated, the recruiting centres swamped. For the second time in a generation Canada was at war. The Prime Minister harboured some hope that the holocaust could yet be averted, though there was no doubt in his mind that the highest stakes were involved. Germany, a society "founded on force, and based on materialism," was out to destroy Britain and France, countries based "on reason and . . . spiritual realities."¹

His fear for the future led Mackenzie King to offer Chamberlain his plan for peace in early October 1939. The plan called for an investigation of the European situation by neutral countries, in particular by the President of the United States, the King of Italy and the King of Belgium. This committee would submit a report to the belligerents who were free to reject, amend, or accept it; but until a decision on the report was made an unconditional truce would be in effect.

This it will be observed is all in the lines of our Industrial Disputes Act and also of L. of N. procedure, the theory being that it is a form of compulsory consideration not arbitration, permitting opportunity for public opinion to be brought to bear; also neutrals suffering because interests certain to be affected.

Mackenzie King, sadly enough, refused to believe that the time for discussion and the free play of reason had died on September 1, 1939. He arranged with Skelton for the suggestion to be sent unofficially after speaking with the Governor-General about it. He had little hope of the proposal being accepted by Britain or France, but he felt he had to make the effort one last time.²

A French memorandum of October 23, 1939, set forth the views of Paris in some detail on the question of war aims, and was communicated to the governments of the belligerent Dominions. By November 2, after giving a great deal of very careful thought to his problem, Mackenzie King had prepared his own lengthy memorandum containing the results of his reflections. His memorandum on war aims expressed the convictions of a lifetime. Formed during the early part of his career as a conciliator of industrial disputes, these beliefs had been confirmed by twelve years' experience as Prime Minister. Indeed, there was a remarkable similarity between the ideas expressed in King's memorandum and those expressed so many years before in Industry and Humanity. In both there was a belief in the rationality of mankind if left on its own, a confidence in the power of investigation to expose evil and to right wrong, and a conviction that coercion only aggravates a problem and makes a settlement more difficult.

A continued hostility to the idea of collective security was expressed in King's memorandum of November 2. The League of Nations had failed because of an attempt to contain a collective security system within the Covenant. "If the League of Nations had not placed its reliance upon force, in other words, sought to identify collective security with coercion, sanctions, etc." there would have been no war of any kind. The United States would have been a member of the organization from the beginning, and there would have been no occasion for the withdrawal of Germany, Italy, and Japan from the League. King believed that the aggressors had been goaded into their aggressions. It was not because of their innately evil designs; the injustices of Versailles had been the main cause of the present conflict.

Collective security based upon coercion and force had the effect of making that which otherwise have been local wars, into world wars, but what is even worse than that, actually creating the conditions for world wars by making powerful, individual nations which wished to right what, in their minds, were national wrongs, prepare to take on all the membership nations of the League in any war in which they might become engaged.

Geneva should have been a forum for the formation of world public opinion. All countries would have been represented at Geneva, and there would have been the opportunity to prevent the outbreak of war by conference "between representative men of all nations." The light of public opinion "will destroy germs that darkness helps to propagate."³ Such tenaciously held views were not shattered by the outbreak of war, but during six years of war Mackenzie King's views would be cautiously and carefully modified.

With the outbreak of war Mackenzie King was more determined than ever to keep external affairs tightly in his control. Public statements dealt with the war effort at home and abroad, but not foreign policy. In the House of Commons the Prime Minister was just as silent despite pressure for a statement. The only time King mentioned the League of Nations was during a question of supply on Canada's contributions to the League, the International Labour Organization, and other international agencies. Support for the League, for collective security, and for a realistic foreign policy was often expressed by backbenchers.⁴ In a statement on the war situation in February 1941 the only reference Mackenzie King made to the League was to say that Canada supported the economic, financial, and humanitarian work of the League which was being forced to operate in conditions of "exceptional difficulty."⁵ The government did, though, recognize the necessity of an international body. "Until we have honesty, justice and respect

for the plighted word⁶, no small nation can be neutral or secure."

The destruction of the Anglo-French alliance by the shattering spring campaign of 1940 upset the world balance of power. Britain turned to the United States for aid and received fifty old American destroyers. But Winston Churchill, Chamberlain's successor, had to pay for this aid by leasing naval and air bases in the British West Indies and Newfoundland for a period of ninety-nine years.⁷ The turn of events in Europe compelled Mackenzie King to look to Canada's defences. The Prime Minister and the President met at Ogdensburg, New York, in August 1940 and agreed on the formation of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence. For Canada the agreement marked the first realization of the altered power structure of the world. An endangered Britain was unable to guarantee Canada's safety; under the circumstances it seemed wise to safeguard Canada by including it in the American defensive system. Yet the agreement had not been preceded by careful planning or an understanding of what was involved. The assumption of the legal equality of the partners and the principle of reciprocal obligation underlay the Ogdensburg Agreement. Nevertheless, Canada was tied militarily to the United States.⁸

The Hyde Park Declaration of April 1941 was another recognition of the importance of the United States to the Canadian war effort. Despite various measures taken in the first two years of the war, Canada's balance of unusable sterling grew while the drain of American dollars gathered speed. The passage of Lend-Lease in March 1941 did nothing to reduce Canada's chronic shortage of American currency, and threatened to shift large British orders for raw materials, food, and armaments to the United States. Before the end of March arrangements were made with London whereby Ottawa agreed to finance British purchases

in Canada itself so long as the purchases were not curtailed. By April the currency shortage was so acute that Mackenzie King went to Washington and Hyde Park, New York, "to pry a favourable agreement out of the Americans." The Hyde Park Declaration, the economic corollary of the Ogdensburg Agreement, was a common plan for the economic defence of North America whereby Canada and the United States were to provide each other with defence articles it was best fit to produce. The Declaration did not solve all of Canada's financial problems but it solved, in large part, the country's balance of payments problems with the United States. It also tied Canada economically, as Ogdensburg tied it militarily, to the United States.⁹

Officials in the Department of External Affairs saw the crucial importance of the United States to the Canadian and British war efforts, and recognized the large shift in the balance of power. In a memorandum which was printed in the May 1941 issue of the Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science¹⁰ R. A. MacKay stressed the immense importance of the United States to any future world settlement. Regardless of the orientation of Canadian foreign policy after the war, argued MacKay, the real success in achieving stability depended on the United States "since as in 1917-18, the disturbance or re-alignment of the balance of power is in her hands."¹¹

The vigorous support given to the idea of a new international organization by individuals in External Affairs from 1941 onward can, in part, be attributed to the dramatic change in the complexion and composition of the Department between 1941 and 1946. Until his death in January 1941, O. D. Skelton had been the undisputed master of the Department though it was Mackenzie King who made policy decisions.¹² Christie and Lapointe also had departed from the scene; leaving the way

open for Norman Robertson, Lester Pearson, and Hume Wrong, all within the Department of External Affairs. All three were nationalists like Skelton but were less afraid of the prospect of "encountering wild beasts in the jungle of power politics." Pearson and Wrong had years of diplomatic experience at Geneva and London. They were to be responsible for conceiving and strongly advocating the idea of functionalism - representation in an international organization based on responsibility according to a state's capacity in economic, social, and military matters - both within their Department and with their political chief.¹³ Robertson succeeded Skelton as Under-Secretary for the duration of the war. He did not fully occupy his predecessor's place, either in the Prime Minister's confidence or in the administrative scheme, but he quickly became King's most trusted advisor.¹⁴

As Under-Secretary, Robertson was responsible for formulating the Canadian response to the changing American policy of 1940-1941. In a long memorandum dated December 22, 1941, Robertson analyzed the current situation of Canadian-American relations. A shift in the American perception of power had occurred. The Republic was now concerned with global, not hemispheric, strategy. Robertson suggested that before the war the United States believed it could save the world by "its example, by minding its own business, pursuing a fair and friendly policy toward its neighbours . . ." The United States was now becoming more direct and forceful in the methods of exerting its influence.

The effect of this 'new appreciation of the enormous strategic importance and strength of the United States' was a 'new sense of . . . "manifest destiny"' and a corresponding disposition to take decisions and accept responsibilities. This change of attitude is very encouraging from the standpoint of the world in general . . . but it does imply quite an important modification

of the special relationship in which Canada has hitherto stood with regard to the United States.

The entry of the United States into the war greatly altered Canada's relative position among the fighting allies. The Dominion was no longer a principal partner in a small group of belligerents, but a secondary power in a wider association.¹⁵

The first time Mackenzie King discussed the post-war world with another political leader was during his visit to Washington in December 1942. Roosevelt and King discussed, among other things, the future of the European colonies in Asia, self-government in India, and the "United Nations." The President told King that he and Churchill had discussed the latter topic the previous December, agreeing that it was to be an organization of countries united in opposing aggression. The Great Powers would provide protection with international police and aid in disarmament. Mackenzie King, concerned with Roosevelt's reliance on the Great Powers to maintain international stability, reminded him of the significance of the Rush-Bagot Agreement and the International Joint Commission as international agreements between states of unequal power on subjects of common interest, namely disarmament and international co-operation. A basis of the international police, suggested Mackenzie King, might be the enforcement of decisions of the International Joint Commission.¹⁶ Roosevelt's scheme did not involve any sort of collective security system; it envisaged world peace being maintained by the Great Powers alone through an international force. The smaller powers would neither contribute to nor have any control over the force. At the moment Mackenzie King was willing to accept the President's scheme.

Early in the new year Mackenzie King received a memorandum from Robertson outlining a discussion between Wrong, Robertson and Malcolm

Macdonald, the British High Commissioner, on the latest developments in negotiations over the form of agreement for the establishment of a United Nations Relief Organization. Robertson thought it was important to give an immediate warning against Canada's acceptance of a Four Power pattern for a post-war organization. Although this was the first time the question had come up in specific form, Robertson advised the government not to restrict its response to an objection "to economic international organizations alone." He went on to make the first explicit statement of what was soon to be known as the functional principle in a memorandum he had drafted as a possible response by Mackenzie King to Macdonald:

While experience between the wars has shown the great practical difficulties of applying to membership in international bodies the legal concept of equality of states, we are confident that no workable international system can be based on the concentration of influence and authority wholly in bodies composed of a few great powers to the exclusion of all the rest. It is not always the largest powers that have the greatest contribution to make to the work of these bodies or the greatest stake in their success. In international economic organizations such as the Relief Administration representation on such bodies can often be determined on a functional basis and in our view this principle should be applied whenever it is feasible.¹⁷

The principle did not meet with immediate acceptance. Washington was prepared to see Canada serve on the Committee of Supplies of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency but not on a directing committee. Ottawa firmly rejected this position in a tough memorandum to the United States on February 9, 1943.¹⁸ This was followed by a note to the representatives of China, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the United States on February 26. Canada would not participate in the activities of the proposed organization unless it was given a position equal to the contribution expected of it.¹⁹

Mackenzie King's displeasure and misgiving at the way the smaller countries in general, and Canada in particular, were being passed by and passed over was clearly evident when he wrote to Leighton McCarthy, the Canadian Minister in Washington. "As you know," wrote King, "we are not satisfied with the place that has been accorded to Canada in some of the bodies set up for the direction of the war." Mackenzie King refused to bow to the Great Powers by demanding that Canada be represented on those bodies in which it had a special interest.

We cannot accept the idea that our relations can be entrusted to the four larger Powers and we have advanced the principle that representation on international bodies should depend on the extent of the contribution which each country would be expected to make for their work. We intend to continue to press for the acceptance of this principle and for Canadian representation on bodies in which we have a special interest.²⁰

Prior to the visit of Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Secretary, to Ottawa in April Wrong sent a memorandum to the Under-Secretary on Canadian views on the organization of the United Nations. In all aspects of the organization's work, Wrong's advice was that Canada "should stick to this functional principle. If we can secure its general acceptance, it would permit the representation of Canada on most of the bodies in which we are deeply interested."²¹

The Opposition tried to pressure the government into a debate on Canada's role in the United Nations organization during the month of March.²² John Diefenbaker was the most prominent member of the Opposition in his attacks on the government. By reason of Canada's new national and international position after the war Diefenbaker argued that she had to undertake greater responsibilities in the new world of international relationships. Isolationism was no longer feasible, "for with the air development that has taken place during the past three

years Canada is on the air highways of the world."²³ On March 19, in response to a question by Gordon Graydon, Mackenzie King quoted his statement in the House of May 24, 1938, and the entire Balfour Declaration as the objectives and foundations of Canadian external policy.²⁴ He said nothing else about foreign policy in general or on the United Nations in particular for another four months.

The functional idea had suffered a severe setback in the UNRRA experience. This experience, instead of influencing the government to abandon the idea, made it more determined to promote the idea all the harder in the future. Henceforth less attention would be paid to the status of the smaller powers and more to the status of Canada.²⁵ Wrong's memorandum in March was the starting point for the development of Canadian policy towards international organizations, and was followed in July with the creation of an interdepartmental body, the Working Committee on Post-Hostilities Problems.²⁶ At the same time the principle made its first public appearance in a statement by Mackenzie King on external affairs and the war situation in the House on July 9, 1943.

The Prime Minister declared that

On the one hand, authority in international affairs must not be concentrated exclusively in the largest powers. On the other, authority cannot be divided equally among all the thirty or more sovereign states that comprise the united nations, or all effective authority will disappear. A number of new international institutions are likely to be set up as a result of the war. In the view of the government, effective representations on these bodies should neither be restricted to the largest states nor necessarily extended to all states. Representation should be determined on a functional basis which will admit to full membership those countries, large or small, which have the greatest contribution to make to the particular object in question.²⁷

The Department of External Affairs was disappointed with the reception of King's statement by the press "in that it has failed to

provoke the attention and useful discussion which its importance warranted." Unfortunately, the statement was poorly timed; the following day's papers were devoted in most part to news of the invasion of Sicily. And the American press, apparently, gave it little space. But the editorial comments were almost unanimously favourable. The functional principle was lauded as "a new and wholly Canadian concept which might contain the solution to a major post-war problem" by the Globe and Mail, the Montreal Gazette, and others.²⁸

Mackenzie King's trip to Washington in May 1943 was in many respects a repeat performance of his visit six months earlier. He and Roosevelt did not discuss matters; Roosevelt lectured to King on his ideas concerning the post-war international organization. The President felt there should be a Supreme Council representing all the United Nations and a "Moderator" who would watch the different countries to ensure compliance with all agreements made in connection with the peace. Roosevelt played to King's vanity by suggesting that either Jan Smuts or he could fill the position.²⁹ Winston Churchill was also in Washington in May 1943, and discussed with the President and various advisers plans for the post-war settlement on May 22, the day after Mackenzie King left Washington. The two Allied leaders did not include the Canadian Prime Minister in their discussions.³⁰ However, before King's departure, the three leaders discussed in a vague manner the post-war settlement. Churchill brought out his idea of regional councils under a world council, but stressed the importance of strong American participation in post-war international relations and any organization established after the war. King was relatively quiet during the conversation.³¹

It had become clear to Mackenzie King, though, that a strong

possibility existed of the Great Powers governing the post-war world.

At the Quebec Conference that August Churchill, Roosevelt, and King discussed the organization of the United Nations. King took advantage of his role as host to tell his guests what he thought.

I did not believe the other United Nations would like it, and I knew the Dominions would resent it. We would not agree to a government of the world by the four most powerful powers . . . it was contrary to conception for which this war was being fought.

Churchill said he favoured having an Assembly of the member nations where "they could talk all they liked."³² As far as Mackenzie King was concerned that was not enough, and told Churchill as much on August 21 when the British Prime Minister met with the Canadian War Committee. King reiterated earlier remarks, saying that the post-war order would have to take account of the views of each nation and that the Dominions would wish individuality to be respected.³³

On November 1, 1943, the Great Powers issued from Moscow their declaration which embodied the United States' proposal. They recognized and supported "the necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international organization, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states, and open to membership by all such States . . . for the maintenance of international peace and security."³⁴ The Moscow Declaration, which was endorsed by the United States Senate, committed the United States to a major role in establishing an international security organization. This important development made it possible for Canada to begin to chart a course in the post-war world. A statement was given to the press by the Prime Minister's office when word of the release reached Ottawa. In it, Mackenzie King welcomed the Moscow Declaration as a clear sign of the solidarity of the Great Powers, particularly in the establishment of a general international organization.

The declaration brings the assurance that the largest powers among the United Nations are pledged to a joint endeavour to devise in concert with other countries effective means of ending the blight of war and establishing freedom from fear throughout the world. The Canadian Government has been consulted about the terms of the Four Power Declaration and is fully in accord with its provisions.³⁵

By the time of the Moscow Declaration the Canadian government had decided on its policy towards a post-war international organization. An international agency was required; an effective system of collective security was needed if it was to avoid the fate of the League of Nations. On this point there was a wide difference of opinion between the Prime Minister and his advisers. In King's view, an assembly of the nations was needed, but it should not be like the League of Nations, which had placed its reliance on force. "Blindly to return to that sort of remedy is simply to hasten the day" for another world war. Rather, it should place its trust in publicity, the efficacy of public opinion, and the pacific settlement of disputes through impartial investigation.³⁶ Mackenzie King rejected completely the concept of collective security.

The only alternative to a general international organization was a series of regional organizations. For the smaller Powers, regionalism meant being dominated by the Great Powers. Churchill's version of regionalism required a unitary Commonwealth in which Great Britain would play the leading role. Opposition within the Department of External Affairs to regionalism was set out by Wrong in a memorandum written on August 7, 1943. Although a regional system based on the continental land masses would put Canada in the American region, it "would also be intimately concerned with security in the European and Asiatic regions." Regionalism would also tend to reinforce the isolationist position in the United States. The war had shown, beyond any doubt, "the truth of the doctrine that peace is indivisible in the modern world, and, therefore,

that security everywhere is the concern of all countries." Nor could regions be identified with continents from a security point of view. Treating the North Atlantic area as a security region rather than the continents of the Western Hemisphere was more realistic. Wrong concluded that "while regional bodies should play a valuable part, it seems desirable that we should support a world system on which any regional bodies would depend."³⁷

Mackenzie King's public reaction to regionalism and a unitary Commonwealth was sparked by a speech by Lord Halifax to a Board of Trade dinner in Toronto on January 24, 1944. Speaking without his own government knowing his text, Halifax thought it desirable and necessary that the Commonwealth be closer together in fields of interest common to every part of it, such as defence and foreign policy, and that the Commonwealth must be the fourth Great Power.³⁸

One week after Halifax's speech in Toronto, Mackenzie King made a lengthy address in the House. King told the Members that he was unable to agree with the conception of the post-war world as outlined by Lord Halifax and Field Marshal Smuts. It ran counter to the spirit of the Moscow Declaration; it was dangerous for Canada:

What we must strive for is close cooperation among those great states themselves, and all other like-minded countries. Behind the conception expressed by Lord Halifax and Field Marshal Smuts there lurks the idea of inevitable rivalry between the great powers. Could Canada, situated as she is geographically between the United States and the Soviet Union, and at the same time a member of the British Commonwealth for one moment give support to such an idea?

His government would not pursue a common policy with the other governments of the Commonwealth. The concept of regionalism ran counter to the establishment of effective world security and was therefore opposed to the true interests of the Commonwealth itself.³⁹

Writing from Washington, Pearson summarized the existing state of Canadian policy. A decision had to be made, based on the history of the past ten years, whether there had been any change in "the problem of Canada's position in the Commonwealth and Canada's position in any wider international organization." A League of Nations was useless if it lacked adequate provision for peaceful change "and police action against the aggressor." This called for a change in the Canadian attitude toward any future equivalent to Articles X and XVI of an international agreement. For itself, wrote Pearson, Canada's post-war goals should be to influence British and American policy and seek a meaningful role in a post-war international organization. By becoming "the leader, among a group of States which are important enough to be necessary to the Big Four but not important enough to be accepted as one of that quartet" Pearson felt these goals could be achieved.⁴⁰ But Pearson did not mention that Mackenzie King would have to completely change his views.

The meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers held in London in May 1944 gave Mackenzie King the opportunity to assert the collective principle and to emphasize the need for the recognition of those countries capable of making sizable contributions to the work of a general international organization. At Chequers on May 7 Churchill outlined his plans for the post-war organization. He envisaged a Council, composed of the four Great Powers, which would have the authority and the responsibility to preserve peace by force. Other countries would, Churchill added, contribute according to their capabilities. Mackenzie King took issue with Churchill on the role of the Great Powers. While he felt it necessary for those Powers to have a leading role because they would be responsible for the maintenance of peace, he did not want to

see them controlling the world. Nor was Mackenzie King willing to have Canada represent Britain on an American regional council, as suggested by Churchill.⁴¹

On May 9 the Canadian Prime Minister attended a meeting of the British Cabinet, the discussion of which centred on the post-war settlement. Churchill stressed very strongly his idea of regional councils, and a United States of Europe. Earlier in the meeting Eden had put more emphasis on a central world organization and regional councils evolving from them. King "spoke out emphatically" against the regional concept. He feared that regional councils would foster regional, hence isolationist, feelings, especially in the United States. If there were to be regional councils as well as a world council, King felt the emphasis "ought to be very strongly on the World Council, and anything done on the Regional Council ought beyond question to emanate from the larger World Council."⁴²

Two days later the Prime Ministers discussed the issue of representation on the world organization. The formal statement Mackenzie King read at this meeting dealt directly with the Canadian attitude towards the regional approach to international organization. Acknowledging the lead of the Great Powers in the World Council because of their major responsibility for international security, King pointed out that "the other and lesser powers" had to have a voice in the Assembly or be able to bring their cases to the World Council and be heard by virtue of "the contributions they can make to world security and prosperity." Representation on the organs of the world organizations should be allotted on the basis of the functional principle.

Although the responsibility of the four Great Powers for maintaining political security must be recognized, nevertheless an effort should be made to give the smaller

Powers a larger share in the direction of the many functional organizations which will be set up, possibly under the direction of the World Council By recognition of the functional principle of representation, we can retain 4-Power leadership in achieving security, but avoid too rigid adherence to the 4-Power principle, which might not be in the best interests of co-operative world order.

He approached the issue of regionalism cautiously, but Mackenzie King was blunt in his rejection of joint Empire representation on world bodies: "Frankly, I do not think representation on the World Peace Council for the 'British Commonwealth and Empire' as such is feasible or really desireable. Representation of the United Kingdom, on the other hand, is indispensable." The suspicions of foreign countries had to be allayed that the Commonwealth was not a power-bloc exploiting its own interests "but a group of like-minded nations whose close association has in the past and may in the future form the most reliable element within the framework of the world order."⁴³ Churchill said there were parts of the statement which were opposed to his views. King's position was buttressed by Smuts, Fraser of New Zealand, and Eden. The meeting was, as Mackenzie King noted in his diary, a defeat for Churchill's ideas on the post-war organization.⁴⁴ Regionalism was not yet dead, but after this meeting Churchill did abandon his advocacy of the regional approach and of regional councils. The British government put all its support on the global concept of international security.

Almost five years of war had not diminished Mackenzie King's antipathy to the League of Nations. During a conversation with Churchill on May 13 King said that he did not believe "there would have been a war if the League of Nations had never existed. The nations would have prepared their alliance and not depended upon a mere façade with the U.S. out and all looking to England." Churchill defended the League, claiming that if action had been taken when the Germans marched

into the Rhineland, war would never have broken out. King was not dissuaded from his opinion.⁴⁵

During the summer of 1944 the Canadians continued to press their case on the British, through whom they hoped to influence the discussions being held at Dumbarton Oaks.⁴⁶ The Canadian government, in its August 2 communication with the British government, felt that the position of the secondary states in the new organization should receive special attention.

. . . the special place accorded to the great powers should not be extended beyond functions in which their active collaboration is indispensable. If they are given too large an authority and too extensive a right of individual veto the result may be that membership will not be sufficiently responsible to secure the participation of important secondary states whose full collaboration would be of the greatest value.

Concern was also expressed over the extensive powers proposed for the Council and the wide scope given to the requirement of unanimity.⁴⁷ At the Dumbarton Oaks meetings, though, the Great Powers were more concerned with the powers and privileges they would possess in the Security Council. The Canadian government repeated its opposition to blocs voting for seats on the Council. Since the main function of the Security Council was to be the prevention of war, the non-permanent Members had to be able to make an effective contribution. Nothing else, with Canada's record in the present war, was acceptable:

You will, I am sure, appreciate how difficult it would be for Canada, after enlisting nearly one million persons in her armed forces and trebling her national debt in order to assist in restoring peace, to accept a situation of parity in this respect with the Dominican Republic or Salvador.⁴⁸

Anxious about the discussions at Dumbarton Oaks, Mackenzie King addressed the House of Commons on August 4 on the subject of post-war organization. Starting with the Moscow Declaration, King outlined part

of the pattern of the post-war international society. He emphasized the fact that the three Great Powers - Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union - saw the necessity of establishing a general international organization "based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states and open to membership by all such states, large and small, for the maintenance of peace and security." The organization of peace after the war was over must not bring the disillusionment that came after 1919. He told the House that this had been the chief subject at the Prime Ministers' meeting in London in May.

There was no doubt that the war had profoundly changed the international situation. One serious threat to future peace was the development of the "flying bomb" which was then only in its infancy. King pointed out it was therefore necessary to preserve a large superiority of power on the side of peace "from the hour of victory."

In the organization of security the methods adopted should be as effective as possible, and should safeguard the interests of Canada. If these conditions were met, the provisions would "commend themselves to the Canadian people so that they can secure steady public support." While the Great Powers were to take the initiative in the establishment of the new international security organization, Mackenzie King was careful to claim a sphere of influence for other powers, particularly on the question of the selection of non-permanent members of the Council. He rejected the division of the world into a two-tiered hierarchy of powers as unreal "and even dangerous." There were the Great Powers, and the smaller powers with varying degrees of power and the capacity to use it for the maintenance of peace. The Prime Minister proposed that the functional principle govern the election of the non-permanent members to the Council, those who had the most to contribute to the

maintenance of peace.

And finally, the Prime Minister warned against the danger of concentrating solely on security and overlooking international action and organization in other fields such as social welfare, trade, technical progress, transportation, and economic development. The general aim of the new world organization, King said, must be to lessen nationalism and national rivalries. He then fired a parting shot against the Commonwealth speaking with a single voice or being permanently represented as such on the new World Council.⁴⁹

Not every Member of Parliament accepted the Prime Minister's August 4 address without criticism. Howard Green, a Progressive Conservative, thought the Commonwealth should be the fourth Power on the Council, otherwise Canada would be following the decisions of the British government just as it had done before 1939. Nor did Green believe that Mackenzie King had found a new and earnest belief in collective security.⁵⁰ The Member's comments reflected his lack of interest in and experience with foreign policy questions. His proposal for a Commonwealth position on the Council showed a certain lack of awareness of the attitude of all the Dominions. It also demonstrated Green's unfamiliarity with the history of the British Commonwealth and the League Council. Nor did he offer any substitute for the functional principle.

The significance of the August 4 speech was that Mackenzie King's views on security and international organization were gradually changing. This was partly a result of the influence of the views of Robertson, Wrong, and Pearson. The Prime Minister himself, though, was aware of the changes occurring in the realm of international politics. His concern with the shape of the post-war world had been present time

and again in the discussions about financial aid to Britain, the Combined Boards, and the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency. These discussions had shown him that there had been a shift in the world's power from Europe and Britain to the United States, that the United States had become aware of its power, that it was now an active world Power, and that the world would never be the same again. It was therefore necessary to influence both British and American policy and seek a meaningful role in the post-war world from which the interests of the Dominion could be protected and furthered. For King, then, the way to achieve these goals was to participate in the activities of the post-war organization from a position which reflected the degree of influence Canada could exert in international politics.

Roosevelt and Churchill met at Quebec City a second time during September 1944. Informed by Wrong on September 16 that the Dumbarton Oaks meeting of the Great Powers was producing a plan giving the Council wide authority in the United Nations and the Great Powers possession of the veto,⁵¹ Mackenzie King brought up the subject with the two world leaders that same day. He told them the small nations would strongly object to the Great Powers appearing to seek to control the world in the organization of its affairs if the main authority of the Council was to tell the other Powers what contributions they might have to make in carrying out Council decisions. In other words, King was arguing against the exclusion of the smaller Powers from the Council. He was prepared to accept Great Power responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security since only they would be able to do it. But the Prime Minister would not and could not accept the notion that the other Powers would do what they were told without first expressing their opinions.⁵² Mackenzie King repeated his position in a personal telegram

to Churchill on September 28 when he urged the British leader to delay publication of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals.⁵³

At Dumbarton Oaks the Great Powers were in agreement that the Security Council should control the functions of maintaining peace and that they were entitled to special status on the Council in view of their responsibility for international security. The latter point meant permanent membership on the Council and a veto over Council decisions. But there was serious disagreement on the question of whether the veto should apply in cases involving one or more of the permanent members themselves. The problem was referred to the political leaders for decision. So the Dumbarton Oaks proposals were published on October 9 without the section on the Security Council voting procedure. But the proposals did show that the Great Powers were generally agreed in their determination to dominate the proposed organization. The Assembly would be essentially only a forum for discussion while the Security Council would have greater powers than the Council of the League of Nations had possessed.⁵⁴

Shortly after the publication of the proposals Mackenzie King issued a statement welcoming the measure of agreement reached and commended the proposals to "the careful and earnest study" of the Canadian people. He refrained from endorsing any proposal and avoided the adoption of a position which would in any way hamper the Canadian representatives at an international conference, as Robertson had advised.⁵⁵ A serious attempt was made to inform Canadians about the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. The Wartime Information Board produced thousands of descriptive pamphlets; newspapers, periodicals, discussion groups, and radio stations discussed the proposals in an attempt to spread information and arouse interest.⁵⁶

The government began exchanging views on the blueprints for the new organization with those countries where Canadian missions were established.⁵⁷ Robertson informed his chief that the Department of External Affairs had given a great deal of thought to the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, especially those dealing with the Security Council.

I am inclined to recommend that we should make some communication, to the great powers at any rate, before the projected meeting between Messrs. Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin takes place. In such a communication I think that we should follow the line that we have already taken with the British Government⁵⁸

The Canadian position on the selection of the non-permanent members of the Security Council and the powers of the Council over the Member States was stated in a private message to the British one last time before the formal Canadian position was made known.⁵⁹ A formal submission to the Great Powers was sent on January 12, 1945, containing suggestions for improving the effectiveness of the new international organization but making no specific amendments to the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. This document stressed that Canada did not claim equal status with the Great Powers, but sought recognition as a "middle power." It declared:

The Canadian record in two world wars, however, has revealed both readiness to join in concerted action against aggression and the possession of substantial military and industrial capacity

The question, therefore, arises whether it is possible within the framework of the general scheme, to devise means of associating more effectively with the work of the Security Council states of the order of international importance of Canada.⁶⁰

Early in March 1945 Mackenzie King visited Washington to see Roosevelt and be briefed on the Yalta Conference and the United States position on the United Nations. It does not appear that the President divulged much about the important discussions, decisions, and concessions made at Yalta. The Prime Minister was told that Churchill did most of

the talking, Stalin had quite a sense of humour, and all three had a friendly time. Mackenzie King asked about the rule of the Great Powers with regard to their control of Germany and Japan after the war, but he was told nothing.⁶¹

The most comprehensive and extended parliamentary debate on foreign policy since 1919 took place between March 19 and March 28, 1945, on a motion by the Prime Minister that the House endorse acceptance by the government of an invitation received March 5 to attend a conference at San Francisco to draft the charter of the United Nations. The House was also asked to accept the principles set forth in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals as a satisfactory basis for a discussion on the charter, and to agree it was of vital importance to Canada that an effective international organization for the maintenance of peace should be established.⁶²

The Prime Minister delivered his address on the Speech from the Throne on March 20. The government accepted the invitation to the conference. King made it clear that the conference at San Francisco was not a peace conference; it would not have anything to do with the preparation of the peace treaties, and would not discuss the terms which the United Nations would impose on Germany and Japan. It would deal only with the constitutional framework of the future society of nations.

There followed a summary of the negotiations and meetings leading up to the present, from the Moscow Conference in 1943, the meeting of the Prime Ministers in May 1944, the discussions at Dumbarton Oaks, and the conference at Yalta. At the most recent conference the three greatest Powers had achieved unified proposals for the character of the world security organization. Mackenzie King saw that as a "hopeful augury. Without the continuing unity among the great powers

there would be little hope for enduring peace."

A great deal of attention was given by the Prime Minister to the purpose of the upcoming conference, which was to erect a firm and enduring structure for the maintenance of peace. The great defect of the League of Nations, the absence of more than half of the Great Powers, was to be avoided. King discussed the framework and functions of each organ of the new organization, comparing it with the League of Nations. The social, economic, and humanitarian activities of the international agencies already established and those being considered, were outlined.

But there were difficulties and objections. Although the organization must function effectively, King declared that it was also important to safeguard Canadian interests. The government objected to the Great Powers in the Security Council possessing the veto, but it had to be conceded so that the Great Powers would have "the will for security." The participation of the Great Powers in the enforcement of peace was imperative; the main tasks rested with them so a price had to be paid. However, King wanted the functional principle to be applied as a method of selection for representation in the Security Council to those states less than great but more than small, who could make an effective contribution to the maintenance of security. He also advocated the development of a procedure which would prevent states not represented on the Security Council from being called on to undertake serious enforcement measures without having a voice in the Council's proceedings.

On this last stipulation the Prime Minister noted that members were to negotiate the number and types of forces, facilities, and assistance they were prepared to give the Security Council. The agreements, which would limit the military aid each member was ready to

give "of its own volition," would need "separate approval in accordance with the constitutional processes of each country. In Canada that would mean approval by parliament before such agreements were ratified." The House was assured by Mackenzie King that the acceptance of the proposals did not commit Canada

to send forces beyond Canadian territory at the call of the security council. If any such commitment were sought, it would be embodied in a later agreement, freely negotiated by the government of Canada, and coming into effect only after it had been approved by parliament.⁶³

Throughout the debate various politicians expressed hope and optimism in the ability of the Allied nations to establish a new League of Nations to prevent war, of the ability of the Great Powers to work together, and in the ability of the new League to avoid the mistakes of the League created at Paris in 1919. But there was no illusion about the future. Gordon Graydon, the Leader of the Opposition, reminded the House:

The eyes of the ordinary citizens of Canada or the world must not be dazzled and blinded and diverted from the realities of the situation by any shining sunlight that may emerge from San Francisco. The machinery for world security will give no irrevocable guarantee that there will never be another war.

Graydon was also careful to emphasize the importance of the British connection and insisted that "nothing done by this nation at the coming conference or elsewhere must endanger our close ties with the British Commonwealth and Empire."⁶⁴

Most of the members agreed with the Prime Minister in the need for seeking satisfactory recognition of the status of "important secondary countries" like Canada. There were those who felt that Canada, on the basis of its war record, should have a permanent seat on the Security Council.⁶⁵ Others denounced the seeming subservience of the Dominion to

the Security Council. A Saskatchewan member declared:

We strictly reserve to ourselves the right to say that we ourselves shall decide whether we shall engage in any war. Then surely if we have no say in the decisions of the security council we are not going to have our armed forces go abroad to fight at the behest of people whom we have no control and who do not represent us in any way whatsoever.⁶⁶

The House leader of the Social Credit party, J. H. Blackmore, linked the Bretton Woods Conference with the San Francisco Conference which, he said, would place Canada "at the mercy of an alien-dominated international power."⁶⁷ Yet he supported the resolution. T. L. Church, the outstanding Tory imperialist, lamented what he considered to be declining support for the British Empire,⁶⁸ while Howard Green reiterated his notion that the British Commonwealth, rather than the United Kingdom, should be permanently represented on the Security Council.⁶⁹

The Conservative party, though, firmly repudiated isolationism and, through John Diefenbaker, accused Mackenzie King of speaking with intentional obscurity on the question of Canada's participation in the enforcement of decisions of the Security Council. Diefenbaker wondered if the Prime Minister's words were intended "in any way to offer a sop to isolationism or little Canadianism of a minority in this country in order to secure support for the resolution."⁷⁰ The C.C.F. party, led by M. J. Coldwell, supported the resolution and favoured Canada having a larger role in the Security Council, but was critical of the sweeping powers of the Council. Broadening the powers of the Assembly to give it the right to determine the armed contribution of any particular nation was favoured by the C.C.F. Coldwell also stressed the value of the Economic and Social Council in dealing with the causes of war.⁷¹ Five independent members from Quebec objected to Canada joining the new international organization. Conferences over the past quarter-century

had not led to peace and F. Dorion, for one, saw no reason to believe the San Francisco Conference would offer any better guarantee or results. "I believe that, not only does this conference fail to offer better expectations but, because of its very organization, it cannot avoid driving the world to anything but another war."⁷²

Despite the amount of time and words devoted by the House of Commons on the upcoming San Francisco Conference, the debate did not result in new arguments for or against Canada's participation in the new United Nations. It was a foregone conclusion that the Dominion would send a delegation to the Conference and would join the organization. Nor did the debate produce a remedy for increasing Canada's modest political powers or an expectation of checking the Great Powers. It did, however, result in an almost unanimous resolution to work for increasing the scope of the lesser Powers. The Prime Minister's revolution was passed on March 28 by a vote of 202 to 5.⁷³

The official Canadian delegation to the San Francisco Conference was drawn from the three major parties and from both the House of Commons and the Senate. Its seven members were Mackenzie King, Louis St. Laurent, Mrs. Cora Casselman, Senator J. H. King, government leader in the Senate, Gordon Graydon and Senator Lucien Moraud of the Conservatives, and M. J. Coldwell of the C.C.F. A group of senior members of the Department of External Affairs, which included Robertson, Wrong and Pearson, were alternate delegates.⁷⁴ For a number of reasons, however, the official delegates had very little to do with the conference. King, St. Laurent, Graydon, and Coldwell were more concerned with the general election than the conference. The Prime Minister's brief stay at San Francisco was, for him, a disillusioning experience.

The diplomacy practiced by the Canadian delegation during the

conference was one of discretion, of using "our influence at the right time and in the right way to get results."⁷⁵ The Canadians were therefore less conspicuous than the Australians, led by Herbert Evatt, who took a much harder position on the veto in the Security Council. The Canadian delegation, with those of the lesser states, was confronted with the harsh realities of Great Power politics: it could accept the sort of United Nations on which the Great Powers had reached agreement, or it could face the possibility of no world security organization at all. If the Great Powers absolutely refused to yield on a certain point, especially the veto, the Canadian delegation would have to make the concession.⁷⁶

On the afternoon of April 27, at the second plenary session of the Conference, Mackenzie King outlined the design of Canadian policy: "The Canadian Delegation comes to this Conference with one central purpose in view. That purpose is to co-operate as completely as we can with the delegations of other nations in bringing into being, as soon as possible, a Charter of world security." He rejected the thesis that power was to be exclusively concentrated in the hands of the Great Powers, bluntly telling the Conference that it "should not act on the assumption that it is." Otherwise, there was a danger of "the development of a new type of isolationism, a feeling that the task of preserving the peace could be left to the great powers." The development of such an attitude would make it difficult for the smaller powers to serve the new organization effectively. The Canadian Prime Minister asserted that his countrymen were "firm in their resolve to do whatever lies in their power to insure that the world will not be engulfed for a third time by a tidal wave of savagery and despotism."⁷⁷

Two weeks later the Prime Minister attended an afternoon meeting

of the Steering Committee dealing with the Security Council. There was discussion on the means of securing consultation and representation on the Council by the small powers before they were asked to join in the enforcement of Council decisions. A speech by a New Zealand delegate gave Mackenzie King the opportunity to state Canada's position before the Committee. As he noted in his diary that evening, "I was tremendously relieved to have this opportunity."⁷⁸

The Committee discussion had shown that, as far as the Great Powers were concerned, a government not represented on the Security Council might be obliged to furnish military forces without any opportunity to contract out or even express its views. King was determined to prevent that idea from carrying for if it had, he would have to return to Parliament with the news that it no longer had the power to decide on the most vital of national questions, despite what he had promised over the years. The following day, May 11, Mackenzie King met with delegates from the other Dominions at Smuts' apartment in the Fairmont Hotel and tried to enlist their support for his position. King told the group that if Canada had gone through the war without conscription "I could have had the Canadian H. of C. agree to any step" which might have been proposed in regard to the international organization. But now he did not see how it was possible to agree to any measures "which meant the conscription of a nation's forces at the instance of 4 or 5 outside great powers." The Canadian Parliament would hesitate to accept a charter with such a provision. Canada was also concerned with conceding the veto power to the Great Powers. With the United Kingdom on the Council, said King, Canada was protected but other countries were not. He seriously doubted whether "ratification for a charter which took the step that was being proposed" was possible.

The Canadian government had to work itself into conceding it, but the significance of the step would come as a shock to Parliament and "certainly the country."⁷⁹ Later that night King made his appeal to Eden and Lord Cranborne, the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs. But he doubted that he had made much of an impression on them.⁸⁰ He had impressed them enough, though, for them to raise the question with Edward Stettinius Jr., the American Secretary of State. Finally, on the morning of May 14, Mackenzie King saw Stettinius before he left San Francisco for the election campaign.

The problem, King told Stettinius, was that of drafting a charter which would come into effect once the organization was formed. But little attention was being paid to securing the necessary approval of the charter "in the first instance." King argued it was essential for the charter to contain something which would be reassuring to the smaller powers while the approval of the charter was being arranged. Adamant that Canada would do its share, King firmly maintained that mandatory parliamentary approval of the employment of military forces before supplying such forces would be political suicide for his government.

Were I to take the line suggested even tentatively by Hickerson /of the U.S. State Department/, it would at once be said in our country that I was doing so to appease those who were not anxious to fight and that the country would become divided on the issue /If the question became an issue in any election & the govt. were defeated, it would certainly prejudice the chances of ratification of the charter in other countries.

For Stettinius the problem in meeting King's position was one of over-representation on the Security Council. The Prime Minister's solution to that was to have the Security Council determine and decide if certain forces were necessary on the basis of the advice of its military advisers. If a country not on the Council was asked to

contribute forces, it would sit on the Security Council when voting took place. Mackenzie King also advised Stettinius that the Security Council should take into consideration the area where the problem was occurring and the advisability of sending certain troops to that area. By being represented on the Security Council and able to present its case, the government could explain to the Canadian people why their forces were being requested. King kept emphasizing that the absence from the Charter of any sort of consultation between the member governments and the Security Council, which could be pointed to when the measure was before Parliament, would be a serious handicap for his government; having something to deflate such criticism would be reassuring.⁸¹

The Prime Minister's efforts achieved a measure of success.

In its final version Article 44 of the Charter stated:

When the Security Council has decided to use force it shall, before calling upon a member not represented on it to provide armed forces in fulfillment of the obligations assumed under Article 43, invite that Member, if the Member so desires, to participate in the decisions of the Security Council concerning the employment of contingents of that Member's armed forces.⁸²

A Member would be invited to participate in a decision of the Security Council, and have the right to vote, after the Security Council had decided to use force. Since the temporary members would sit on the Council one by one, they alone could not alter the regular vote of the Council. Moreover, every member-state would remain obligated to contribute armed forces in accordance with the final decision. Finally, initiative was placed on the Member concerned to ask for the privilege of temporary membership.⁸³ It should be noted that Article 44 was not a rejection of collective security, but a means of making the idea more acceptable to those who did not understand collective security. The Security Council has never been able to take any military action on

behalf of the United Nations, though, so the question of interpreting Article 44 has never arisen.

The functional principle was incorporated into Article 23 which stated:

The General Assembly shall elect six other Members of the United Nations to be non-permanent members of the Security Council, due regard being specially paid, in the first instance to the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution.⁸⁴

The criteria for the election of non-permanent Members were not meant to be a rigid formula, but an indication of the considerations the General Assembly was to take into account when voting. In the first election of the non-permanent members to the Security Council the functional principle and "geographical distribution" were neatly balanced. Pearson was very disappointed with the outcome of the election. Mackenzie King, on the other hand, was rather pleased because it meant Canada was not immediately required to be "in the lime-light."⁸⁵

At San Francisco Mackenzie King was not an enthusiastic internationalist like St. Laurent or Pearson. He was preoccupied with asserting Canada's sovereignty by attempting to check the powers of the Security Council. His disillusionment with the proceedings at the conference was the result of the polarization of the Great Powers, and was shared by many others. St. Laurent was more enthusiastic about the possibilities of the new organization than the Prime Minister, and was more anxious to have Canada do its full part to make the organization effective. St. Laurent and Pearson were convinced of the importance of "putting teeth" in the United Nations by creating an international police force under its command. All three were agreed, though, that the organization had to be truly international in character, and it was

necessary for all the Great Powers to be members if the organization was to be effective.

The Charter of the United Nations was presented to the Canadian Parliament in October 1945. The war in Europe and Asia was over, but it had ended in Asia with the American use of the atomic bomb. The ratification of the Charter by the United States Senate had simplified the problem of Canadian participation in the United Nations. The breakdown of the London Conference of Foreign Ministers in September 1945 almost eliminated the unity of the Great Powers on which the Charter had been based. Thus the parliamentary debate reflected a mood of uneasiness and uncertainty about the future which was growing in Canada. Since the Prime Minister was in Britain St. Laurent, the Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs, presented the government's arguments for ratifying the Charter on October 16. The Charter was not an ideal document, but it was "a great improvement on the Dumbarton Oaks proposals."⁸⁶ The Charter of the United Nations was, after three days' debate, unanimously approved by Parliament.

Chapter V

EPILOGUE

When Canada joined the League of Nations in 1919 it was primarily concerned with membership as a demonstration of its emergence as an autonomous state. At the very beginning, however, Canadians were disturbed about the obligations assumed. They accepted in principle the idea of collective security but were reluctant to support policies which would make the idea a reality. From 1919 to 1923 the Borden, Meighen, and King governments sought to emasculate Article X of the Covenant. In subsequent years Mackenzie King opposed attempts by other states to strengthen the collective security system, through the Draft Treaty of Mutual Guarantee, the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance, and the Geneva Protocol.

The Abyssinian crisis of 1935 was met by the King government, elected to office during the crisis, with caution. The new government announced that the Dominion would cooperate in applying the proposed economic sanctions, but warned that it did not recognize any commitment binding Canada to adopt military sanctions. The unauthorized actions of Walter Riddell on the Committee of Eighteen were disclaimed by the Canadian government. Throughout the crisis Mackenzie King was acutely aware of the dangers of an active policy, to both his cabinet and to his country. The oil sanction was never applied, and Italy won its war of conquest. At the League Assembly in September 1936 the Canadian Prime Minister disavowed the usefulness of collective security. In future, Canada would make no binding commitments for either economic or

military sanctions. It would act in accordance with existing circumstances and with concrete information, not in accordance with some system or out of passive obedience to the Covenant.

Although Canada, and Mackenzie King, had successfully evaded binding security commitments which might drag both into war, nevertheless the Dominion became in September 1939 one of the initial participants in the Second World War. The war shoved Canada into a world in which the familiar pillars and signposts of international affairs had been swept away. During the war the centres of power in the world had shifted from Europe to the Soviet Union and the United States. The Canadian government's concern with the shape of the post-war world was demonstrated time and again in discussions about financial aid to Britain, the Combined Boards, and in the establishing of post-war international agencies. Mackenzie King recognized that, more than ever, it was necessary to influence American and British policy. Otherwise, Canada was in danger of becoming a vassal state dependent on the United States.¹

Mackenzie King never seriously considered eliminating from the realm of international affairs an agency where nations could meet to discuss and attempt to amicably resolve differences. It was better to talk than fight. The failure of all attempts to avert war in 1938-1939 seems to have convinced the Prime Minister that a greater effort on the part of all nations was required to ensure peace. Each nation would be expected to make a contribution to those international agencies which dealt with the social, economic, and humanitarian aspects of post-war reconstruction, and particularly in the area of international security, for Mackenzie King could not accept the notion of Great Power domination of the world as the assurance of peace and security. In other words, he subscribed to the "functional principle."

The functional principle was an attempt by individuals in the Department of External Affairs to find a pragmatic theory to fit the facts of the emerging power constellation and at the same time justify a Canadian role in international affairs. Under the principle each nation should have responsibility appropriate to its particular capacities. In the new United Nations this was aimed at the non-permanent seats of the Security Council whereby preference would be given to the so-called middle powers, which were able to make some military contribution to international security, over the small powers that did not have the military capabilities and so might not act responsibly.

The functional principle was thus the Canadian weapon in the struggle for increased influence, a struggle which would continue after the war. At the San Francisco Conference Mackenzie King was mainly concerned with the question of status and minimizing Canada's obligations under the proposed Charter. His objective was to establish Canada's right as a middle power to due consideration in the structure of the United Nations, especially during the election of members for the non-permanent seats on the Security Council and in the event of military sanctions being applied by the Security Council. But Canada accepted the Charter of the United Nations that came out of the San Francisco Conference without pressing too hard for special recognition.

It was clear to Mackenzie King, soon after the end of the war and the signing of the Charter, that the United Nations had little chance for success. The Prime Minister was severely shaken by the uncovering of an extensive Soviet espionage ring in Canada during the Gouzenko affair.² He was greatly alarmed at the Soviet Union's encroachment in different parts of the world, particularly in Asia. There was no doubt in King's mind that it intended to develop an atomic

bomb and would go to all lengths in doing so. He was appalled at the prospect: "to try to fight a war with atomic bombs is just too appalling a thought for words."³ Having no false hopes about the continuation of the wartime alliance between Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union, Mackenzie King saw the United Nations as a pawn of the Great Powers, particularly the Soviet Union which used it as a spring-board to develop propaganda to serve its own ends, namely the emasculation of the world organization and the internal division of the Western world.⁴ More than ever, Mackenzie King wanted Canada to have little to do with the new international security organization. But the days of the policy of avoiding commitments and relying on the "Parliament will decide" formula were gone.

Canadian foreign policy up to 1939 was very circumspect, very cautious, almost "to the point of timidity."⁵ It reflected Mackenzie King's and O. D. Skelton's perception of the fragility of the Canadian duality. The Prime Minister was convinced that an active foreign policy would invariably produce controversy at home and thus threaten the internal unity of the country. King recognized that a nation's foreign policy was only as effective as its internal strength. He therefore sought to build up domestic unity by following a policy of no commitments. The Second World War changed the state of international affairs, and forced the rapid development of national unity in Canada. Aware of these external and internal developments, the Department of External Affairs and the Prime Minister sought a policy which would meet the new circumstances. The approach to international affairs remained pragmatic, but after 1945 Canadian foreign policy became much more active and adventurous.

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⁴ League of Nations, Records of the First Assembly, Plenary Meetings 1920, p. 275, League of Nations, Records of the Second Assembly, Plenary Meetings 1921, p. 834. Sir Robert Borden and Arthur Meighen based their opposition to Article X, in part, on the hope of drawing the United States out of its isolation and into the League of Nations. This goal also influenced Meighen's opposition to a renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty in 1921 and Borden's conversations at Washington in 1922. M. G. Fry, Illusions of Security North Atlantic Diplomacy 1918-22, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972).

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¹⁶ Report of the Canadian Delegates to the Third Assembly of the League of Nations, 1922, p. 3.

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virtual guarantee against effective Council or Assembly action on an issue. By the terms of the Covenant war was legalized under certain circumstances. Furthermore, the "interpretation" of Article XVI in 1921 eliminated the "automatic" sanctions. The interpretative resolution of 1923 meant that the final decision on what action was to be taken under Article X rested with the government of each member-state.

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³⁸ W. A. Riddell, World Security by Conference, (Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1947), p. 27.

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⁵⁵ Ibid., Saturday, January 21, 1922. The exact date of Skelton's appointment is not clear, but it occurred some time between February 13 and March 2. Documents, Vol. 4, Document 530, pp. 562-3, Document 774, p. 780.

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⁵⁹ King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, Vol. 112 file 801, O. D. Skelton to W. L. M. King, December 22, 1924.

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⁶¹ Ibid., Document 506, pp. 542-8; J. Eayrs, In Defence of Canada Vol. 1 From the Great War to the Great Depression (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1964), p. 11.

⁶² R. Dandurand, Les Mémoires du Sénateur Raoul Dandurand, ed. M. Hamelin, (Québec: Les Presses de l'Université Laval, 1967), p. 274.

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⁶⁴ Debates, 1925 Vol. 1, p. 12.

⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 24.

⁶⁶ King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, Vol. 140 file 1137 Treaties - Geneva Protocol, pp. C101645-59.

⁶⁷ Documents, Vol. 3, Document 509, p. 550, Document 511, p. 551.

⁶⁸ Ibid., Document 512, pp. 551-2.

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⁷⁰ Stacey, The Arts of War and Peace 1914-1945, Document 194, pp. 511-12.

⁷¹ Debates, 1925 Vol. 2, pp. 1048-50.

⁷² Diary, Saturday, March 7, 1925.

⁷³ King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, Vol. 113 file 803, O. D. Skelton to W. L. M. King, March 31, 1925, pp. C83670-1.

⁷⁴ Documents, Vol. 3, Document 374, p. 433. Walter Riddell had been Deputy Minister of Labour for the Province of Ontario during the Great War. He joined the permanent staff of the International Labour Organization in Geneva in 1920, and remained there until his appointment as Canadian Advisory Officer in 1924. He was External Affairs' specialist in League affairs and was regularly included in the Canadian delegations during his tenure as Canadian Advisory Officer. W. Riddell, World Security by Conference, (Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1947), pp. 15-17, 28.

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⁷⁶ Documents, Vol. 3, Document 375, p. 433.

⁷⁷ Ibid., Document 376, p. 434.

⁷⁸ Walters, A History of the League of Nations, Vol. 1, pp. 320-3.

⁷⁹ Documents, Vol. 3, Document 479, p. 600.

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¹⁰¹ Documents, Vol. 4, Document 572, p. 690.

¹⁰² Ibid., Document 576, pp. 691-2.

¹⁰³ Debates, 1928 Vol. 3, pp. 2695, 3063-4.

¹⁰⁴ Gathorne-Hardy, A Short History of International Affairs 1920-1939, pp. 182-3.

¹⁰⁵ Documents, Vol. 4, Document 589, pp. 700-1.

¹⁰⁶ League of Nations, Official Journal, Special Supplement No. 64, Records of the Ninth Ordinary Session of the Assembly, Plenary Meeting, Text of the Debates, pp. 59-61. The difference between King's position at Geneva and his earlier instructions to Riddell was that, instead of agreeing to allow the Security Committee to deal with non-justiciable disputes, he refused to allow any international committee to deal with any dispute between Canada and any other nation.

¹⁰⁷ Page, "Canadians and the League of Nations Before the Manchurian Crisis," p. 461.

¹⁰⁸ Ottawa Citizen, November 9, 1928; The Globe, November 24, 1928.

¹⁰⁹ Diary, Wednesday, September 5, 1928.

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² Ibid., 1933 Vol. 5, p. 5067.

³ Ibid., 1932 Vol. 2, pp. 1825-6; 1933 Vol. 2, pp. 1367-70.

⁴ Ibid., 1932 Vol. 1, pp. 29-30.

⁵ Gathorne-Hardy, A Short History of International Affairs 1920-1939, pp. 320-1.

⁶ Ibid., pp. 346-56.

⁷ Veatch, Canada and the League of Nations, p. 126.

⁸ Ibid., pp. 133-4.

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²⁰ R. Bothwell and J. English, "'Dirty Work At the Crossroads': New Perspectives on the Riddell Incident," Canadian Historical Association Annual Report 1972, pp. 272-3.

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³¹ Documents, Vol. 5, Document 441, p. 405.

³² Bothwell and English, "'Dirty Work At The Crossroads': New Perspectives on the Riddell Incident," pp. 264-77.

³³ Debates, 1936 Vol. 1, p. 93.

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⁴⁰ King Papers, Memoranda and Notes, Vol. 164 file 1507 "Press References to Oil Embargo," pp. C117503-4.

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⁹¹ Ibid., Vol. 229 W. L. M. King to Lord Tweedsmuir, October 2, 1936.

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²⁵ J. Eayrs, In Defence of Canada Vol. 3 Peacemaking and Deterrence, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972), p. 163.

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Chapter V

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